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 This paper analyzes the effectiveness of Sino-U.S. governmental law enforcement 
cooperation to combat human smuggling.  A history of bilateral law enforcement 
cooperation against human smuggling is presented, with emphasis given to the period 
since 1993.  U.S. immigration statistics, along with statistics from the U.S. Coast Guard, 
are presented as a measure of the success of law enforcement efforts.  In the analysis that 
follows, identification is made of factors that seem to have hindered and obstructed, or 
promoted and advanced Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation. 
This study finds that sudden shifts in the macroclimate of Sino-U.S. relations may 
positively or adversely affect cooperation on law enforcement matters, including human 
smuggling. In the current case, bilateral cooperation against human smuggling has been 
advanced by spillover effects of convergent Sino-U.S. counterterrorism interests that 
occurred in the wake of September 11.  Next, it is found that the creation of formal 
bilateral institutions for law enforcement cooperation since 1997 has facilitated improved 
effectiveness in Sino-U.S. work against human smuggling. Finally, this study finds that 
the effectiveness of bilateral law enforcement cooperation against human smuggling has 
been substantially undermined by the inability of the two sides to maintain an effective 










 The topic of this thesis is Sino-U.S. cooperation to combat human smuggling.  In 
recent years, numerous works have examined the phenomena of human smuggling and 
illegal immigration from China.1  This paper analyzes the effectiveness of Sino-U.S. 
governmental law enforcement cooperation to address human smuggling.  This analysis 
seeks to answer the question, “What factors have assisted cooperation, and what factors 
have obstructed cooperation?”  This paper will not describe in detail the nature of human 
smuggling or examine the causes of organized illegal immigration.  Rather, it will 
analyze the history of cooperation between agencies of the U.S. and PRC governments in 
dealing with human smuggling, and then identify factors that seem to have either 
hindered and obstructed, or promoted and advanced that cooperation. 
I hypothesize that sudden changes in the macroclimate of Sino-U.S. relations, by 
producing a convergence of high-level interests between the two sides, can bring about 
improved law enforcement cooperation against numerous criminal activities, including 
human smuggling.  Second, I hypothesize that the creation of a formal mechanism for 
bilateral law enforcement cooperation has fostered greater cooperation to combat human 
smuggling.    Next, I hypothesize that a failure by the U.S. and the PRC to establish a 




1 Ko-Lin Chin, Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2001), examines the motivations for and methods of illegal immigration from China, the 
social organization of human smuggling, and the experiences of smuggled immigrants after their arrival in 
the U.S;.  Peter Kwong, Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor (New York: 
The New Press, 1997) focuses on the pull factor of demand for illegal immigrant labor, and a volume 
compiled by Paul Smith, ed., Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to 
America’s Immigration Tradition (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 
examines the history, geographic sources, and future trends of human smuggling from China. 
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reliable deterrent based on a high probability of swift repatriation has substantially 
undermined the effectiveness of Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation against human 
smuggling; the failure of Sino-U.S. coordination on repatriations can, in turn, be traced to 
Beijing’s perception that U.S. asylum policies politicize illegal immigration. 
 A distinction must here be made between human smuggling and human 
trafficking, terms that are often- and mistakably- used interchangeably.  Human 
smuggling involves a transaction between the smuggler and the smuggled, where the 
smuggler receives a financial or other material benefit.  The 2000 Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, a supplement to the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines human smuggling as “the 
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State of a Party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident.”2  Human trafficking, on the other hand, necessarily 
involves physical or psychological abuse, exploitation, violation of human rights, fraud, 
or coercion.3  Forced prostitution, for example, falls within the realm of human 
trafficking, not human smuggling.4   This paper deals only with human smuggling, or 
“alien smuggling”, the term used by both the PRC and U.S. governments. 
 
 




2 United Nations, “Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” 2000, 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2001/pdf/18e.pdf. 
 
3 Glossary on Migration, Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2004, p. 60. 
 
4 Christine Bruckert and Colette Parent, “Trafficking in Human Beings and Organized Crime: A Literature 
Review,” (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Research and Evaluation Branch, Community, Contract, and 
Aboriginal Policing Services Department, June 2002, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca. 
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Structure and Methodology 
 To test the hypotheses outlined above, I first reconstruct a history of bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation against human smuggling.  While human smuggling from China 
to the United States began occurring in the late nineteenth century, this paper will focus 
on how PRC and U.S. authorities have worked together to counter illegal migration since 
the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979, with greatest 
emphasis devoted to the period after 1990.  The evidence used to construct this history 
comes from State Department records, U.S. and PRC media reports, PRC government 
press releases, press releases from the U.S. Department of State, Department of Justice, 
and the Department of the Treasury, Congressional testimonies, U.S. government 
research reports, U.S. government statistics, scholarly books, and scholarly journal 
articles. 
After presenting a history of bilateral law enforcement cooperation, I then analyze 
the effectiveness of this cooperation.  This analysis is made possible by a set of 
interviews conducted by telephone and in person with former and current U.S. and PRC 
officials in February and March 2007.  Interviewees were asked their estimates of factors 
promoting and/or retarding effective U.S.-PRC cooperation in countering human 
smuggling.   Through work experience in diplomacy and/or law enforcement, each 
interviewee had accumulated substantial exposure to and knowledge of Sino-U.S. 
dealings on the matter of human smuggling.  The majority of the interviews were 
conducted in face-to-face meetings in Washington, while the remaining interviews were 
conducted via telephone and email exchanges.  In all, a total of 12 interviews were 
conducted. 
The topic addressed in this work is a highly sensitive one, owing to the law 
enforcement as well as to the diplomatic aspects of the topic.  In conducting research for 
this study, the author did not have the opportunity to draw on classified materials.  The 
insights, recounting of events, and anecdotal evidence provided by interviewees were 
 4 
exceptionally instructive; nevertheless, the author’s lack of direct access to operational 
records of law enforcement, classified studies, minutes of meetings, or other like 
materials limits the scope of conclusions that may be drawn from this study. 
 The structure of the analysis parallels the sequence of the hypotheses stated 
above.  The paper concludes with a summary of the analysis of Sino-U.S. law 
enforcement cooperation against human smuggling, and with policy recommendations for 




A HISTORY OF SINO-U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION 
TO COMBAT HUMAN SMUGGLING 
 
 In analyzing the history of bilateral cooperation against human smuggling, it is 
necessary to look at both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation against human smuggling.  For the qualitative dimension of 
cooperation, the history of contacts and coordination between the two sides is examined.  
In evaluating the quantitative dimension, immigration statistics (from the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service and Department of Homeland Security) and U.S. Coast Guard 
migrant interdiction statistics are employed to assess the inflow of illegal immigrants to 
the U.S. from China, and the number of illegals returned to China.  These statistics, in 
turn, can be taken as a measure of the effectiveness with which the U.S. and the PRC 
have met their frequently-stated goal of working together to stem the tide of human 
smuggling.5  The immigration statistics are used in this study to measure the effectiveness 
with which PRC and U.S. authorities have worked together to reduce the likelihood that 
illegal Chinese immigrants can, once apprehended, remain in the U.S.  The Coast Guard 
statistics, meanwhile, can serve as partial indicators of the effectiveness with which the 
U.S. and PRC cooperated to deter human smuggling. 




5 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “China-U.S. Joint 
Statement,” http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zysj/jzxfm/t36249.htm; U.S. State Department, 
“Meissner Says Cooperative U.S.-China Anti-Smuggling Efforts Succeeding,” U.S. Official Policy 
Materials on US-China Relations, 12 October 2000, http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-
USIAINFO.EXE?A2=ind0010b&L=us-china&D=1&H=1&O=D&P=1047, accessed 12 January 2007; Jane 
Morse, “Homeland Security Chief to Discuss Illegal Migration on Asia Trip: Chertoff Says Cooperation 
Vital to Control Smuggling, Illegal Immigration,” U.S. Department of State, Washington File, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2006/Mar/27-458544.html, 24 March 2006, accessed 16 January 2007. 
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 The illegal immigration of Chinese to the United States predates the 20th century.  
The Chinese Exclusion Act, enacted by Congress in 1882, barred Chinese laborers from 
entering the U.S. Almost immediately after the ban was enacted, a flow of illegal Chinese 
immigrants began arriving.  In the final years of the nineteenth century, an estimated 
20,000 Chinese entered the U.S. with the help of smugglers.6  Willard Myers reports that 
from the late nineteenth century until about 1970, Chinese seeking entry into the U.S. 
relied on the “back door” (houmen)- stowaways on merchant vessels jumped ship when 
the vessels made port in the U.S.  Cantonese from Taishan used the routes to join their 
family members already in the U.S., while Fujianese first began arriving through the back 
door in 1940.  By the close of the 1960s, 90 percent of the Fujianese in the U.S. were 
married males between the ages of 40 and 55 whose families remained in Fujian.  After 
years of working in Cantonese-owned businesses, by the late 1960s these Fujianese, 
concentrated in New York and surrounding areas in the northeast U.S., had established an 
economic base sufficiently large to support the immigration of family members still in 
the PRC.7 
 The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 eliminated the national 
origins quota system and abolished preferences that favored immigrants from Europe.8  
Still, the absence of official diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the People’s 




6 Ko-Lin Chin, Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1999), 28. 
 
7 Willard H. Myers III, “Of Qining, Qinshu, Guanxi, and Shetou,” in Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant 
Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition, ed. Paul J. Smith (Washington: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 98-100; Marlowe Hood, “Sourcing the Problem: Why 
Fuzhou,” in Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration 
Tradition, ed. Paul J. Smith (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 77. 
 
8 David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992), 80. 
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Republic of China (PRC) meant that even after the passage of the INA, the door remained 
closed to direct legal immigration from PRC to the U.S.  The illegal status of the U.S. 
Fujianese prevented them from sponsoring immigration of family members, so they 
instead turned to Hong Kong-based smuggling networks to guide the passage of family 
members to the U.S.9  Family members fled the PRC, gained entry into Hong Kong as 
political refugees, and were issued identity cards.  Hong Kong travel agencies then 
helped the “refugees” obtain entry visas and airline tickets to Central American countries.  
After flying to Central America, the Fujianese migrants were - for a fee- smuggled across 
the U.S.-Mexico border by Cantonese-led smuggling organizations.10 
 Before proceeding further in a discussion of the evolution of Chinese human 
smuggling, an introduction to the organizations profiting from human smuggling is 
instructive- as is a brief overview of the U.S. policies on asylum. 
Composition, structure, and operational characteristics of Chinese human 
smuggling organizations 
Few attempts have been made to scientifically research smuggling organizations, 
often referred to simply as “smuggling rings” or “criminal gangs” in both U.S. and PRC 
media reports.  Because of the long distances and complex logistics involved with 
organizing and operating illegal immigration, a very common assumption of U.S. law 
enforcement has been that traditional Chinese criminal organizations- triads, tongs, street 
                                                 
 
 
9 Willard H. Myers III, “Of Qining, Qinshu, Guanxi, and Shetou,” in Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant 
Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition, ed. Paul J. Smith (Washington: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 93-133. 
 
10 Peter Kwong, Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor (New York: The 
New Press, 1997), 28-29; According to a high-ranking State Department official familiar with the 
history of U.S. operations in Hong Kong between 1968 and 1973, there was no U.S.-PRC law 
enforcement cooperation on the issue of human smuggling in that time. (Author’s interview with 
retired State Department official, 16 February 2007.) 
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gangs, or a combination thereof- are the key players behind global human smuggling of 
Chinese, and that a sophisticated international network- a well-oiled supply chain- exists 
to transport the illegal immigrants from point to point, from China to the United States or 
other destination.11  
The findings of Zhang and Chin from interviews conducted with 129 persons 
participants in planning and execution human smuggling (snakeheads, or shetou), 
however, do not support these assumptions.  Rather, the study found that snakeheads are 
“ordinary individuals” who utilize guanxi and other available resources to accomplish the 
smuggling of individuals from China to the U.S.  The groups behind smuggling 
operations, according to the study, are not traditional Chinese crime organizations (i.e., 
triads, tongs, or Chinese street gangs), nor do they possess a hierarchical structure 
characteristic of traditional criminal organizations.  Rather, Zhang and Chin find 
smuggling organizations to be “flexible international networks”, analogous in structure to 
ad hoc task forces, or “temporary alliances” are formed to conduct a smuggling operation 
and dissolved upon completion of an operation.  The groups typically contain three to 
five individuals, all operating on a shared commitment not to an organization, creed, or 
central figure, but rather to an opportunity for profits.  No one figure wields unrivaled 




11 Sheldon Zhang and Ko-Lin Chin, “Enter the Dragon: Inside Chinese Human Smuggling Organizations,” 
Criminology 40, no. 4 (November 2002), 741; for an example of such an assumption by U.S. law 
enforcement authorities, see John Marsh and Chris Dobson, “Government Sets Up Taskforce to Stop 
Triads,” South China Morning Post, 8 December 1991. 
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power over others within the group.  Chinese smugglers, are not “organized gangs” that 
will seek to collude with foreign criminal organizations, a recent study found.12 
Geographically, snakeheads were found to reside in the U.S., Hong Kong, PRC, 
and Taiwan.13  The smugglers surveyed by Zhang and Chin represented a diverse array of 
occupations, from small business owner to farmer, casting doubt on notions of 
snakeheads as professional full-time criminals.14 
 The work of a smuggling organization, research has found, is divided into several 
highly-specialized roles, with no apparent hierarchy among them. The positions identified 
by Zhang and Chin include: recruiters, who refer would-be migrants to the smuggling 
operation.  coordinators, who utilize connections to obtain whatever services are required 
for any portions of the operation;  transporters, who assist illegal immigrants to a ship or 
plane, or from a ship to a safehouse; document vendors, who procure fraudulent or 
illegally-obtained  authentic passports and other necessary documentation; corrupt public 
officials, such as customs inspectors or border police, who receive payments to facilitate 
safe exits and entries by the illegal immigrants; guides and crew members, who work on 
smuggling ships or accompany immigrants on air flights; enforcers, who keep order and 
                                                 
 
 
12 Ko-Lin Chin and Roy Godson, “Organized Crime and the Political-Criminal Nexus in China,” Organized 
Crime 9, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 7. 
 
13 Ko-lin Chin and Roy Godson, “Organized Crime and the Political-Criminal Nexus in China,” Organized 
Crime, 9, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 22. 
 
14 Sheldon Zhang and Ko-Lin Chin, “Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers: A Cross-National 




distribute food and water to illegals while on ships; debt collectors, who detain the illegal 
immigrants after arrival until the smuggling fee has been paid.15 
Overview of U.S. asylum policy 
 Although the issues of asylum and repatriation do not fall entirely within the 
realm of law enforcement, I believe that they are highly relevant to law enforcement 
officials from both sides who work to combat human smuggling.  Each interviewee spoke 
about the roles that asylum, detention, and repatriation play in bilateral cooperation on 
this issue.  In the next chapter, I explain why and how the issues of asylum and 
repatriation have affected law enforcement cooperation on this issue. 
Asylum is a type of protection allowing individuals who are physically present in 
the U.S. (or who are seeking entry at a port of entry) and who meet the 1965  
Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of a refugee to remain in the U.S.  Thus, in 
order to be granted asylum, an alien must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned 
to his home country, he would face persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.16 
 There are two paths by which persons in the U.S. may seek asylum.  Persons not 
in removal (deportation) proceedings may seek asylum through the affirmative path.  This 
involves applying to a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) center and 
                                                 
 
 
15 Sheldon Zhang and Ko-Lin Chin, “Enter the Dragon: Inside Chinese Human Smuggling Organizations,” 
Criminology 40, no. 4 (November 2002): 751-754. 
 
16 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and Nationality Act §101(a)(42)(A), 
http://www.uscis.gov/propub/ProPubVAP.jsp?dockey=cb90c19a50729fb47fb0686648558dbe, accessed 27 
June 2007; Congressional Research Service Report RL32621, “U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum 
Seekers,” 25 January 2007, p. 1; United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Asylum,” 
http://www.uscis.gov, accessed 27 June 2007. 
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appearing before a USCIS asylum officer.   For illegal immigrants who arrive in the U.S. 
without proper documents and are found to have credible fears of persecution, or for 
illegal immigrants who have been placed in removal proceedings, requests for asylum are 
made defensively, before an Immigration Judge with the Executive Office or Immigration 
Review (EOIR).  If the judge rules in favor of the asylum request, then the immigrant is 
granted the right to remain in the U.S. and to become a Legal Permanent Resident.  If the 
request is denied, the decision may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), and BIA rulings may be appealed to U.S. federal courts.17 
The evolution of human smuggling from China to the U.S., 1978-1993 
In January 1978, CCP Central Committee Member Liao Chengzhi announced that 
overseas Chinese would be welcomed to visit the PRC.  At the same time, Liao declared, 
PRC citizens with relatives and family overseas- a group previously viewed with 
suspicion and outright hostility for their overseas links- should be allowed to travel out of 
China for reunions and visits.18  In Fujian province, a province with rich historical 
connections to overseas Chinese (40 percent of the then-24 million residents had relatives 
overseas19), Liao’s announcement was especially significant.  The subsequent granting of 
the right to travel to the U.S.20 and other countries unleashed, as Zai Liang writes, a  
                                                 
 
 
17 USCIS, “Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two Paths,” http://www.uscis.gov, accessed 27 June 
2007. 
 
18 C.Y. Chang, “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy,” China Quarterly 82 (June 1980): 281-303; Jay 
Mathews, “Peking Promises to Ease Curbs on Foreign Trips,” Washington Post, 4 January 1977. 
 
19 Jay Mathews,“U.S.-Chinese Links Aid Coastal Fuzhou,” Washington Post, 8 April 1980.. 
 
20 Jay Mathews, “Many Chinese Coming to U.S. in Policy Shift,” Washington Post, 25 January 1979.. 
 12 
“fever of going abroad” (chuguo re) throughout Fujian.  The supply of proper channels 
for emigration allowed by the PRC government, however, was far too small to meet the 
growing demand.  Despite Beijing’s liberalization of emigration laws that began in 1978, 
by the mid-1980s the central government had opened only two channels for persons who 
dreamed of venturing overseas: studying abroad or reuniting with family members.  
Therefore, all but a small number of Chinese- those with a college degree or with family 
overseas- were excluded from the option of emigrating legally.21  To meet the rising 
demand for passage overseas, Chinese turned to Hong Kong-based smuggling 
organizations for passage to the U.S.  According to Willard Myers, the rates of Fujianese 
illegal emigration to the U.S. by way of the Hong Kong-to-Central America air route 
accelerated after 1979.  By 1982, most of the separate families of the illegal Fujianese 
immigrants in New York had been reunited, and the flow of illegal Fujianese to the U.S. 
slowed measurably.  Between 1970 and 1982, the use of the airborne smuggling routes 
operating from Hong Kong enabled four times the number of Fujianese to arrive illegally 
in the U.S. as had arrived legally or illegally in the preceding three decades.22  
Taiwanese criminal entrepreneurs began taking over the Fujian-to-U.S. smuggling 
routes in 1982. Leveraging ancestral connections to Fujianese, along with global 
distribution capabilities, transportation routes, and a smuggling infrastructure resulting in 
part from past Taiwanese involvement in smuggling of Golden Triangle heroin, the 




21 Zai Liang, “Demography of Illicit Emigration from China: A Sending Country’s Perspective,” 
Sociological Forum 16, no. 4 (Dec 2001): 680-681. 
 
22 Willard H. Myers III, “Of Qining, Qinshu, Guanxi, and Shetou,” in Human Smuggling, ed. Smith, 100. 
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Taiwanese began building a global smuggling industry capable of transporting large 
numbers of Chinese to the U.S.  Persons in the U.S. Fujianese community sought out 
Fujianese “brokers” in the U.S. to arrange the smuggling of friends or relatives.  The 
brokers contacted partners in China to obtain the necessary paperwork for departure, and 
the illegal migrant would fly from Hong Kong and on to Latin America before being 
smuggled overland into the U.S.23 
 James Chin cites estimates that illegal PRC immigration to the U.S. occurred at 
the level of a “few thousand” annually during the mid- to late 1980s.24  Between 1984 
and 1986, media reports on growing numbers of non-Mexican illegal immigrants 
referenced the increasing presence of illegal Chinese immigrants at U.S. borders; 
however, these accounts did not include estimates the size of Chinese illegal immigration 
flow during the 1984 to 1986 period.25  
 The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) authorized legal 
permanent resident status for illegal aliens who could prove residence in the U.S. since 1 
January 1982.26  IRCA, by holding out a path to citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants submitting applications by 1988, drove a mass influx of illegal Chinese from 




23 Willard H. Myers III, “Of Qining, Qinshu, Guanxi, and Shetou,” in Human Smuggling, ed. Smith106-
111. 
 
24 James K. Chin, “Reducing Irregular Migration from China,” International Migration 41, no. 3 
(September 2003): 51. 
 
25 Robert Pear, “Immigration and the Randomness of Ethnic Mix,” New York Times, 2 October 1984; 
Robert Lindsey, “Illegal Entry by Non-Mexicans on Rise at Border,” New York Times, 7 October 1985; 
John Dillin, “U.S. Hiring Bans on Illegal Aliens Can Work,” Christian Science Monitor, 8 November 1985; 
New York Times “Canadian Border Faces Alien Problem of its Own,” 20 April 1986; John Dillin, “Spies, 
Terrorists & U.S. Border,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 March 1986; Robert Reinhold, “Flow of Third 
World Immigrants Alters Weave of U.S. Society,” New York Times, 30 June 1986. 
 
26 David W. Haines and Karen E. Rosenblum, eds., Illegal Immigration in America (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1999). 
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1986 into 1993.   In the period between 1988 and 1993, as illegal Chinese immigration 
into the U.S. peaked, twelve new routes through Central America, Eastern Europe, and 
the Caribbean opened.27  In November 1989, responding to the June 1989 crackdown 
against pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square, President George H.W. Bush 
issued a directive to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to prevent the 
deportation of PRC nationals in the U.S., and to allow them to remain in the U.S. through 
1 January 1994.28  President Bush reiterated this directive in Executive Order (E.O.) 
12711, issued 11 April 1990.  Moreover, E.O. 12711 directed immigration authorities to 
give “enhanced consideration” for admission through political asylum to any otherwise 
deportable individual who feared persecution based on the forced abortion or coerced 
sterilization policies of that person’s home country.29 The collective effect of IRCA and 
E.O. 12711 was to offer a window of opportunity for undocumented Chinese to gain legal 
status. The forced abortion provision in E.O. 12711 provided a basis that any future 
illegal Chinese immigrants could claim in an effort to gain asylum in the U.S. and block 
deportation.  Repatriation to the PRC, in other words, was a virtual impossibility.   IRCA 
also fueled a rise in illegal immigration through legalizing the undocumented Fujianese 
already in the U.S., mostly in New York.  The newly-legalized status of the U.S. 




27 Kwong, Forbidden Workers, 31-33. 
 
28 George Bush, “Memorandum of Disapproval for the Bill Providing Emergency Chinese Immigration 
Relief,” 30 November 1989, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=17883, accessed 4 June 
2007. 
 
29 George Bush, “Executive Order 12711: Policy Implementation with Respect to Nationals of the People’s 
Republic of China,” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23556, accessed 4 June 2007. 
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Fujianese community freed up economic resources to meet the surge in demand from 
those in Fujian seeking passage to the U.S.30 
The number of apprehensions of illegal Chinese immigrants in the U.S. ballooned 
by 370 percent from 288 arrests in 1988 to 1,353 in 1990.31  Because statistics on illegal 
immigration flows are by nature imprecise, and because illegal Chinese immigration 
received relatively little attention from researches, estimates of the yearly numbers of 
Chinese smuggled into the U.S. in the early 1990s varied widely.   The estimates, notes 
one analyst, ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 per year.  In 1995, an interagency working 
group of the U.S. government put the figure at 50,000 smuggled Chinese to the U.S. per 
year.32  Willard Myers claimed that in each year from 1990 through 1993, over 100,000 
Fujianese were smuggled to the U.S. at the average price of $32,000 per person, resulting 
in earnings of $9 million per day for the smuggling industry.33 A San Francisco 
Chronicle investigative reporter’s account in 1993 stated that “several hundred thousand” 
Chinese, primarily Fujianese, had arrived as illegal immigrants in the U.S. since the early 
1980s.34 




30 Willard H. Myers III, “Of Qining, Qinshu, Guanxi, and Shetou,” in Human Smuggling, ed. Smith, 119-
120. 
 
31 Donatella Lortch, “Immigrants From China Pay Dearly to Be Slaves,” New York Times, 3 January 1991. 
 
32 Paul J. Smith, ed., .Human Smuggling,: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s 
Immigration Tradition, Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997, x; The 
report cited, Presidential Initiative to Deter Alien Smuggling, was produced by the Interagency Working 
Group, comprising officials from the State Department, Justice Department, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Coast Guard, Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
33 Willard H. Myers III, “Of Qining, Qinshu, Guanxi, and Shetou,” in Human Smuggling, ed. Smith, 113. 
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In the United States, media coverage and popular debate surrounding illegal 
immigration had focused overwhelmingly on the entry of Mexican illegals into the 
country.  Thus, the seemingly sudden appearance beginning in 1992 of a large number of 
dilapidated, migrant-laden boats with Chinese seeking entry into the U.S. surprised and 
quickly stirred the curiosity of the American media and the general public.  The 1993 
arrival of the Golden Venture was most responsible for alerting the U.S. government and 
American public to the seriousness of Chinese human smuggling.  
 In the early morning hours of 6 June 1993, the Golden Venture, a 150-foot coastal 
freighter carrying 286 would-be illegal Chinese immigrants, ran aground off Rockaway 
Beach in New York City.  Desperate to reach U.S. soil, a number of migrants dove into 
the chilly Atlantic Ocean and attempted to swim the 200 final yards to safety.  Eight 
persons drowned before reaching the shore.35  By late morning, images of Chinese 
immigrants huddling in blankets on a New York City beach had been fed to media outlets 
across the world.  The issue of Chinese human smuggling had, quite literally, become 
front-page news overnight. 
Initial attempts at bilateral law enforcement cooperation to combat human 
smuggling, 1993-1994 
 This section reviews the development of Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation 
to combat human smuggling in 1993 and 1994, the period in which human smuggling 
emerged as a significant issue in the two countries’ law enforcement relations.  The initial 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
34 Pamela Burdman, “Business of Human Smuggling Tests U.S. Immigration Policies,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, 30 April 1993. 
 
35 Robert D. McFadden, “Smuggled to New York: The Overview—7 Die as Crowded Immigrant Ship 
Grounds off Queens; Chinese Aboard Are Seized for Illegal Entry,” New York Times, 7 June 1993. 
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reactions of and statements by both the PRC and U.S. governments indicated a desire and 
willingness to work with each other in fighting human smuggling.  In the interaction that 
followed, however, three problematic issues quickly arose.  The issues examined here 
include the PRC’s frustration with the U.S. political asylum policy, U.S. complaints of 
Chinese inaction in fighting human smuggling, and U.S. fears that repatriated illegal 
migrants would face punishment upon return to the PRC. 
 A PRC Ministry of Public Security (MPS) official shared with the author that 
Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation began in the early 1980s with meetings between 
the U.S. Secret Service and the Ministry of Public Security to plan security for high-level 
visits by leaders from each side.36  According to a former U.S.  Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) official who investigated Chinese human smuggling cases, 
very little cooperation occurred in the late 1970s and in the 1980s between the two sides 
on the issue of human smuggling.37 
 Doris Meissner, INS Commissioner from 1993 to 2000, emphasized that the surge 
in Chinese human smuggling in 1993 occurred at a time in which illegal immigration 
from nations other than Mexico had recently begun to receive considerable attention from 
the White House.  Mass numbers of seafaring Haitian migrants attempting to reach U.S. 
shores were interdicted and detained at U.S. facilities at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in 
1991 and 1992, sparking widespread debate in the U.S. over whether the Haitians should 
be allowed entry.  In early 1993, the involvement of illegal immigrants in two high-
profile U.S. crimes- the January shooting outside Central Intelligence Agency 
headquarters that killed two CIA employees, and the February bombing of the World 
Trade Center- led to intense pressure on the Clinton Administration to reform the asylum 




36 Author’s interview with MPS official, 1 March 2007. 
 
37 Author’s interview with Department of Homeland Security official, 2 March 2007. 
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system; in both cases, the key suspects were living in the U.S. pending resolution of 
asylum claims.38  These cases, followed by the appearance of 300 illegal immigrants on 
the Golden Venture off the shores of New York City, drove the Administration to 
respond quickly to the emerging threat of Chinese human smuggling.39 
On the day after the Golden Venture arrival, the PRC Consulate in San Francisco 
released a statement saying that the Chinese Government welcomed proposals from 
President Clinton to strengthen Sino-U.S. cooperation against human smuggling.40  
Speaking just after the incident, an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that out 
of concern for law and order, and out of a desire to ensure the safety of PRC citizens 
abroad, the PRC was willing to work with U.S. authorities to fight human smuggling.41   
Following the U.S. Coast Guard’s seizure of three more smuggling vessels in the Pacific 
in July 1993, an official at the PRC Consulate General in Los Angeles reiterated the 
PRC’s desire to cooperate with other governments to address the problem.42 
On 18 June 1993, less than two weeks after the Golden Venture landing, President 
Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 9 (PDD 9), a new strategy to combat 
                                                 
 
 
38 Irwin Arieff, “CIA Shooting Suspect Was Seeking Asylum in United States,” Reuters, 10 February 1993; 
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human smuggling through preemption, interdiction, and deterrence.  An interagency 
group, composed of representatives from the Departments of Justice, Transportation, 
Labor, State, and Defense, as well as from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Coast Guard, and intelligence community, and co-chaired by the Domestic Policy 
Council and the National Security Council, was organized and given the mission to lead 
comprehensive U.S. efforts to combat large-scale migrant smuggling by boat.  The 
strategy included four main components: tightening domestic law enforcement efforts by 
stiffening penalties against smugglers, combating smuggling operations at their source 
through intelligence collection and policy coordination with foreign governments, Coast 
Guard interdiction of migrant ships in transit, and modifying procedures for processing 
entry claims and returns of economic migrants arriving illegally in the U.S.43 
While responses of both the Chinese and the American governments to this 
rapidly emerging human smuggling problem in 1993 acknowledged that effective efforts 
to counter smuggling must involve international law enforcement cooperation, statements 
from leaders and law enforcement officials on each side revealed potential obstacles to 
effective cooperation. 
 In PRC media reports and government statements, declarations of China’s 
willingness to cooperate with the U.S. against human smuggling were tempered by 
Chinese accusations that U.S policies were partly to blame for the perpetuation of the 
                                                 
 
 
43 “Fact Sheet: Alien Smuggling Policy,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, in U.S. Department 
of State Dispatch Washington DC, June 18, 1993, U.S. State Department, Dispatch 4 no. 29 (19 July 
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problem.  The PRC Consul General in New York, intended destination of the Golden 
Venture, criticized U.S. authorities for failing to take “proper measures.”  Although the 
report did not elaborate on the specifics of this criticism, the Consul General said that the 
U.S. was not demonstrating a willingness to cooperate with PRC authorities to address 
illegal immigration.44  The underlying nature of the Consul General’s criticism may be 
inferred by examining a statement from the leaders of the Fujian CCP Central Committee 
following the Golden Venture landing.  This statement was explicit and specific in its 
criticism of U.S. laws and policies.  The problem behind human smuggling was U.S. 
immigration policy that allowed illegal immigrants to claim political asylum and be 
released while their claims awaited adjudication.  Upon release, illegal PRC immigrants 
proceeded to flee into U.S. Chinese communities.  In order for effective bilateral 
cooperation to occur, the Fujian leaders said, the U.S. needed to change its laws. 
In asking China for cooperation in preventing illegal human smuggling, the 
United States should first improve its immigration law, strictly enforce the law, 
and immediately send back illegal immigrants to their original countries.45 
 
In other words, in the viewpoint of these officials, the China-to-U.S. human smuggling 
problem was at root not a law enforcement problem, but rather a law problem; namely, 
the U.S. asylum law. 
 Statements made by American law enforcement personnel suggested that the 
cooperation-espousing statements typical of PRC leaders were not commensurate with 
the actions of Chinese authorities on human smuggling cases. In December 1992, just 




44 “Envoy on U.S. Policy on Illegal Immigrants,” Ming Pao, 8 June 1993, FBIS. 
 
45 “Daily Urges U.S. to Improve Immigration Laws,” Ta Kung Pao, 9 June 1993, FBIS. 
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after a freighter, the Manyoshi Maru, landed in San Francisco with 180 Chinese citizens 
in its cargo hold, a U.S. immigration enforcement official in Hawaii remarked that the 
PRC government’s silence on the case was consistent with its non-responses after four 
previous similar incidents that same year.  The official stated that the Chinese 
government had not contacted U.S. authorities after any of the ship apprehensions in his 
district.46   These complaints of systematic PRC silence, along with accusations by U.S. 
officials of PRC inaction on enforcement,47 amounted to U.S. skepticism that PRC 
authorities viewed human smuggling as a problem.  Various motives offered at the time 
to explain this pattern of PRC silence included embarrassment at the conditions of the 
migrants and ships, frustration with U.S. asylum policies, or official complicity.48 
 State Department spokesman Michael McCurry revealed that even before the 
Golden Venture incident in June1993, the U.S. had sought unsuccessfully in bilateral 
meetings to discuss the problem of law enforcement cooperation on human smuggling.49  
After the Golden Venture, on at least four occasions between 25 July 1993 and 20 
November 199650, Secretary of State Warren Christopher raised the issue in discussions 




46 April Lynch and Pamela Burdman, “China is Silent About Smuggler Ship,” San Francisco Chronicle, 25 
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49 U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing,” 7 June1993, 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1993/9306/930607db.html, accessed 11 February 
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50 25 July 1993, 24 January 1994, 13 April 1995, 20 November 1996.   
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with his Chinese counterpart, PRC Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.  
When the two officials met on the sidelines of a July 1993 meeting in Singapore of Asian 
foreign ministers, combating human smuggling was one of three issues that dominated 
their discussions.51  In this meeting, Christopher urged the Chinese to investigate the 
smuggling and ensure the fair treatment of illegal migrants returned by the U.S.  
Christopher’s urging was prompted by U.S. concerns over the case of the East Wood, a 
cargo ship carrying 524 Chinese would-be illegal immigrants that was interdicted by the 
U.S. Coast Guard near the Marshal Islands in February 1993.52  After repatriating the 
Chinese in March 1993 following assurances from the PRC that none of the migrants 
would be persecuted for leaving China illegally, the U.S. received a report that same 
month that PRC authorities had in fact detained more than 100 of the migrants upon their 
return to Fujian.53  Most passengers, according to a U.S. newspaper account, were fined 
the equivalent of $1,250 by PRC authorities, and unconfirmed reports said that other East 
Wood returnees were sentenced to forced labor on a new airport project.54   
In the view of Chinese officials, the assurances given to the U.S. that returnees 
would not be punished or fined had not been violated.  A Fujian Province official, 




51 The other two issues on the agenda for discussions were U.S. concerns over possible PRC exports of M-
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speaking about a group of returnees who had been repatriated via Mexico in July 1993, 
acknowledged that authorities were “accommodating” returnees in custody for the 
purpose of ascertaining migrants’ identities, investigating their links with snakeheads, 
and conducting medical checks.  Repeat offenders were being sent to re-education 
through labor (laojiao) programs.  The Fujian official claimed that both the 
accommodating in custody of first offender returned migrants and the reeducation 
through labor for repeat offenders differed from imprisonment or detention.  In addition, 
returned migrants were made to pay “cash penalties” of 15,000 yuan to the Fuzhou 
Branch of the People’s Armed Police.  Half the amount served as a penalty, while the 
other half covered the costs of each migrant’s food, transportation, and 
accommodations.55   
The U.S. asylum policy, in the PRC view, was a fundamental source of the human 
smuggling problem.  Now, the U.S. was requesting that the PRC accord returned illegal 
migrants treatment that the U.S. found acceptable.  Thus, the U.S. requests that China 
treat returnees well and step up enforcement appeared quite presumptive to PRC officials.  
Nevertheless, in response to Christopher’s urging, Qian promised that the PRC would not 
punish returnees, and that smuggling boats would be banned from PRC harbors.56   
A State Department briefing memorandum for a 24 January 1994 Christopher-
Qian luncheon in Paris reported that following the Qian assurances from the July 1993 
meeting in Singapore, the PRC did in fact crack down on human smuggling, arresting 
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smugglers and corrupt local officials.  Most significantly, the PRC had agreed to receive 
the first mass repatriation from the U.S. of Chinese whose asylum claims had been turned 
down by U.S. courts57  On 18 January 1994, 118 PRC citizens were flown from 
California to Fujian.58  Background notes for an April 1995 Christopher-Qian meeting, 
however, made clear that although the PRC government had continued cracking down on 
snakeheads and local corruption in Fujian, the Chinese had not shown an ability to act 
quickly to make arrangements for accepting returned illegal immigrants.  As a result, the 
deterrent effect of repatriations had been weakened.59 
 Meanwhile, the two sides were relatively successful at arranging the returns of 
would-be illegal immigrants interdicted in international waters (and thus not legally 
eligible for asylum).  In April 1994, a senior INS official led a delegation from the State 
Department and Department of Justice to Beijing for four days of talks with PRC officials 
on law enforcement cooperation against human smuggling.  In an interview with the 
author, the official recalled that after two days of negotiations, the two sides were able to 
work out an agreed-upon process to govern repatriations of migrants interdicted at sea.   
In light of the difficulties that had plagued U.S.-PRC efforts to accomplish repatriations 
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of illegal Chinese immigrants from the U.S., the U.S. diplomats and law enforcement 
officials were pleased with the outcome of the talks on interdicted migrants.60 
Statistical measures of the progress of cooperation against human smuggling, 1982-
2005 
 What do statistics say about the effectiveness of Sino-U.S. cooperative efforts to 
combat human smuggling after the early 1990s?  First, U.S. Coast Guard statistics show 
that interdiction of PRC migrants in smuggling vessels at sea leveled off after a steep rise 
in the early 1990s.  Between 1982 and 1990, as depicted in Table 1 below, the Coast 
Guard intercepted only 28 smuggling vessels with Chinese.  Then, between 1991 and 
1993, a documented total of 2,830 such interdictions were made.  While the total of 861 
interdictions between 1994 and 1996 was far greater than the minimal pre-1991 incident 




Table 1. Illegal PRC Migrants Interdicted and Apprehended, 1982-2005 
FISCAL YEAR PRC MIGRANTS INTERDICTED 





1982 0 2,226 
1983 0 2,717 
1984 0 2,002 
1985 12 (no data) 
1986 11 1,757** 
1987 0 * 
                                                 
 
 
60 Interview with former INS official, 28 February 2007. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
FISCAL YEAR PRC MIGRANTS INTERDICTED 





1988 0 * 
1989 5 * 
1990 0 1,353 
1991 138 5,764 
1992 181 1,392 
1993 2,511 1,767 
1994 291 1,168 
1995 509 759 
1996 61 692 
1997 240 656 
1998 212 1,145 
1999 1,092 2,585 
2000 261 1,810 
2001 53 1,297 
2002 80 1,753 
2003 15 1,190 
2004 68 1,560 
2005 32 2,890 
*Data not available 
**Includes PRC and Taiwan 
SOURCES: U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Law Enforcement, Alien Migrant Interdiction Statistics, 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/amio/FlowStats/FY.htm, accessed 17 March 2007; U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. 
Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1982-2001 editions; United States Department of 
Homeland Security.  Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland 




These figures lead to several inferences.  First, the decline in the number of Coast 
Guard interdictions between 1994 and 1996 suggests that the stepped-up law enforcement 
efforts of President Clinton’s anti-smuggling strategy, introduced in 1993, effectively 
deterred would-be illegals from undertaking the sea journeys.  Another possibility, 
however, is that for every smuggling vessel that the Coast Guard interdicted or for every 
migrant apprehended by another agency, many more vessels and migrants escaped 
undetected.  Thus, while absolute levels of interdiction and apprehension may suggest a 
shrinking flow from 1994, these yearly totals were negligible in comparison to the sum of 
migrants who managed to complete their journeys by ship or by other means.  Supporting 
this conclusion is the widely agreed-upon view that seaborne migrant smuggling, though 
highly visible, is not nearly the most popular method employed by snakeheads.   Analysts 
believe that more illegal Chinese immigrants reach the U.S. by a combination of air and 
land routes than by sea.61  For purposes of this paper, however, the absolute volume is not 
most important.  Either flow- by sea or by land- would be satisfactory as an indicator of  
“effectiveness”.  Coast Guard data is used here because it is available and consistent over 
the last 25 years. 
 How accurately does the sharp downward trend in interdictions and apprehensions 
that began in 1994 reflect changes in the total number of Chinese who sought to enter the 
U.S. through human smuggling?  Willard Myers, who reported annual arrivals of 100,000 
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Fujianese to the U.S. between 1990 and 1993, writes that only around 15,000 Fujianese 
made the journey in 1994, and that the number fell further to around 5,000 in 1995.62  If 
these figures are reasonably accurate, then the success rate of interdictions improved 
markedly from 1993 to 1995.  In 1993, 4,278 migrants were interdicted or apprehended 
while approximately 100,000 reached the U.S., meaning that for every 23 illegal 
immigrants who successfully completed the journey, one illegal immigrant was caught.  
This ratio fell to 10 to 1 in 1994, before falling further to 4 to 1 in 1995. 
With the exception of a surge in FY1999, the annual number of ship interdictions 
of smuggled Chinese by the U.S. Coast Guard continued to decline from the one-year 
high of 2,511 in 1993.  The statistics in Table 1 show that the total number (248) of PRC 
citizens interdicted by the Coast Guard between FY2001 and FY2005 was less than the 
number of persons interdicted in FY2000 alone.  The number of deportable PRC aliens 
located by U.S. authorities in 2005, meanwhile, was the highest total since 1983, thus 
suggesting that human smugglers continue to shift toward other means of attempted entry 
to the U.S.   
Were the shifts attributable to more effective Sino-U.S. cooperation against 
human smuggling?  INS Commissioner Doris Meissner said in 2000 that the sharp 
decline in the number of smuggling vessels intercepted by the Coast Guard was the “best 
measure of how effective our cooperative efforts have been.”63 
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 To what extent was the substantial drop between 1993 and 1996 in the numbers of 
attempts at China-to-U.S. human smuggling the result of effective deterrence?  And, if 
effective deterrence was a factor, was the deterrence a product of law enforcement 
cooperation between China and the U.S.?  Did U.S. pressure on the PRC lead to 
successful enforcement?  In 1997, Jonathan Winer, then the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for International Narcotics Matters and Law Enforcement Affairs, attributed the 
decrease in the number of Chinese vessels interdicted- from seven in 1993 to three in 
1995- to the enforcement and deterrent measures, including closer international 
cooperation, prescribed by the 1993 Clinton directive detailing the U.S. government’s 
response to human smuggling.64   
While deterrence may have successfully reduced the frequency of seaborne 
migrant smuggling after 1993, deterrence against migrants traveling by other means was 
much less successful.  Since 1993, U.S. strategies to combat illegal immigration have 
stressed the deterrent value of a high likelihood of detentions and repatriations.  As the 
likelihood that an illegal alien will face detention and removal upon apprehension 
increases, the incentive for attempting illegal immigration decreases.65 Thus, the INS 
Commissioner’s judgment that Sino-U.S. cooperation had been “effective” tells only part 
of the story.  In the case of Chinese illegal immigration to the U.S., the two nations have 




64 Jonathan M. Winer, “Alien Smuggling: Elements of the Problem and the U.S. Response,” paper 
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65 Author’s interview with Doris Meissner, 21 February 2007; author’s interview with Department of 
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not successfully worked together to build and maintain a credible deterrent based on a 
high probability of detention and removal. 
 Table 2 illustrates the disparity between the inflow and outflow of undocumented 
PRC immigrants to the U.S. between 1981 and 2005.  The sum of deportable aliens and 
individuals filing for asylum provides a rough number for the yearly inflow of 
undocumented PRC migrants in the U.S.  “Asylum cases” may represent more than one 
person; in past years, between 1.2 and 1.4 persons are included in the average case. 
 
 































1981 * * * * * 34 n/a 
1982 2,226 ** ** ** ** 45 n/a 
1983 2,217 25 ** 25 42 43 1.8% 
1984 2,002 56 94 56 192 27 1.3% 
1985 (no data) (no data) (no data) (no data) (no data) 41 n/a 
1986 1,757* 47 32 47 10 73 4.0% 
1987 (not 
available) 
75 52 75 12 38 n/a 
1988 (not 
available) 
205 142 205 13 42 n/a 
1989 (not 
available) 
561 526 561 23 65 n/a 
1990 1,353 1,287 763 1,287 49 30 1.1% 
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1991 5,764 (no data) (no data) (no data) (no data) 43 n/a 
1992 1,392 3,464 4,344 3,464 37 77 1.6% 
1993 1,767 14,433 17,827 14,433 254 94 1.6% 
1994 1,168 10,839 27,076 10,839 704 448 3.7% 
1995 759 4,822 26,240 4,822 290 308 5.5% 
1996 692 1,976 15,133 1,976 230 517 19.4% 
1997 656 2,377 6,681 404 186 488 16.1% 
1998 1,145 3,075 4,833 508 399 571 13.5% 
1999 2,585 4,209 4,333 940 494 428 6.3% 
2000 1.810 5,745 *** 2,514 293 549 7.3% 
2001 1,297 8,137 *** 4,07 188 503 5.3% 
2002 1,753 10,522 *** 5,030 253 494 4.0% 
2003 1,190 4,750 *** 2,024 219 717 12.1% 
2004 1,560 2,839 *** 737 101 705 16.0% 
2005 2,890 ** *** ** ** 594 n/a 
*Statistics only available for PRC+Taiwan 
**Statistics not available 
***Statistics not reported after 1999 
SOURCES: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 editions; United States. Department of Homeland Security.  Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration 
Statistics, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 editions. 
 
The number of annual formal removals of PRC aliens is extremely small relative 
to the inflow of PRC aliens, taken as a sum of deportable aliens apprehended and asylum 
cases filed. The ratio of removals to arrivals is taken as the “return ratio.”  Between 1983 
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and 1995, the return ratio never exceeded 5.5% in the years for which data were 
available.  The odds of a PRC illegal migrant facing deportation, then, were very low 
through 1996.  These low odds of removal strongly counteract- or even nullify- the 
deterrent value that the threat of deportation might have to snakeheads and would-be 
illegal immigrants.  The low return rate caused the pending caseload for PRC asylum 
seekers, very small in the early- to mid 1980s, to swell to over 26,000 at the end of 1995 
before falling to 15,000 by the end of 1996. 
The return ratio more than tripled from 1995 to 1996, pointing to vastly improved 
cooperation to effect repatriations.  By 2001, however, the ratio had fallen to 5.3%, below 
the 1995 level.  The outflow of PRC aliens, measured through formal removals, has 
remained quite low relative to the inflow of PRC aliens, taken as a sum of deportable 
aliens located and asylum cases filed by PRC aliens.  Despite the 1998 establishment of a 
bilateral mechanism for law enforcement cooperation, discussed below, there has been no 
accompanying sustained increase in the annual outflow rates of PRC illegal aliens from 
the U.S.  The overwhelming majority of undocumented arrivals from the PRC are 
remaining in the U.S., as evidenced both by the low return ratio and the number of 
pending asylum cases. 
 The total of pending cases did show a decline from 1997 to 1999, the last year in 
which the U.S. immigration statistics published the figure.  This trend may reflect an 
increasing number of aliens whose cases have been fully adjudicated, and who have been 
placed under a final order of removal (i.e., they have exhausted their appeals through 
immigration courts).  No historical figures are publicly available, however, for the 
number of PRC aliens under final order of removal.  Media reports, government studies, 
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and the author’s personal interviews from 2006 and 2007 have approximated this figure 
at 40,000.66 
Formalizing bilateral law enforcement cooperation, 1997-present 
Before 1997, there was no formal mechanism to facilitate Sino-U.S. bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation against human smuggling.  Rather, according to a State 
Department official, cooperation took place on a case-by-case basis, without any agreed-
upon procedures, regular consultations or ongoing interaction between law enforcement 
authorities from the two sides.  Communications on law enforcement matters were 
handled by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Law Enforcement and Narcotics, 
and by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.67  No extradition treaty between the U.S. 
and the PRC existed- a condition that continues today.  As a result, criminal suspects 
apprehended in either the U.S. or the PRC could not be sent to the other country for 
prosecution. 
 In June 1997, the U.S. announced that offices for the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service would open in the Beijing embassy and the Guangzhou consulate.  
The establishment of the two offices in China was part of Operation Global Reach, 
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launched in 1995 and expanded in 1997.68  Overall, 45 new INS agents would be posted 
to 13 new offices worldwide.  The purpose of these offices and personnel was to enhance 
INS overseas intelligence gathering capabilities, conduct fraudulent document training, 
and assist investigative efforts.69  Stationing U.S. agents in international locations was 
also intended to strengthen working-level cooperation between INS agents and their 
foreign law enforcement counterparts.70  The U.S. had long sought Beijing’s approval to 
station of immigration agents in China.71 
In a joint statement issued by President Clinton and PRC President Jiang Zemin at 
their October 1997 summit meeting in Washington, the two leaders formally declared 
their intention to strengthen bilateral cooperation in law enforcement matters.  The scope 
of criminal activity targeted by these cooperative efforts was to include international 
organized crime, drug trafficking, and human smuggling.  Law enforcement officials 
from the two sides, the statement read, were to begin sharing information and engaging in 
regular consultations.72  A “joint liaison group for law enforcement cooperation” would 
be created to address the three crimes listed above, as well as money laundering and 
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counterfeiting.  The Jiang-Clinton talks set in motion bilateral negotiations for reaching a 
mutual legal assistance agreement.73  The two sides also agreed to an exchange of law 
enforcement officers; the U.S. would post Drug Enforcement Administration liaison 
officers in Beijing, while the PRC would post an official from the Ministry of Public 
Security in Washington to serve as a drug liaison officer.74 
The Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation: Leadership, Organization, 
and Participants 
The first meeting of the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on Law Enforcement 
Cooperation came in Beijing in May 1998 to work out the details of the leaders’ 
agreement.75  A memorandum of understanding was signed by State Department and 
PRC Foreign Ministry officials to formally establish the JLG, and preliminary 
discussions were held on cooperation against the five transnational crimes specified in the 
October 1997 agreements from the Clinton-Jiang summit.76  
 As shown below in Table 3, the major national-level law enforcement agencies 
from each side are represented in the JLG.  The Department of State and the Department 
of Justice are the lead agencies for the U.S., while the MPS is the chief representative 
from the PRC.  At the JLG’s formal meetings, U.S. delegations are co-chaired by a 
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs.  
 
Table 3.  Agencies Represented in the Sino-U.S. Joint Liaison Group for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation 
U.S. AGENCIES  PRC AGENCIES 
Department of State, Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (lead agency) 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (lead 
agency) 
Department of Justice (lead agency)  Ministry of Public Security (lead 
agency) 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation  Ministry of Justice 
Drug Enforcement Administration   
Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement 
  
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol   
Treasury Department   
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives 
  
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy 
  
Secret Service   
Source: Author’s interviews with JLG participants, 28 March-2 February 2007; media reports. 
  
 The first meeting of the JLG was held in 1999.  After meeting in 2000, the JLG 
did not hold another formal meeting until February 2005.  At the 2005 meeting, both 
sides agreed that future meetings would be held annually, with expert groups also 
meeting yearly between the larger plenary meetings.  Table 4 lists the dates and 







Table 4.  Plenary Meetings of the Sino-U.S. Joint Liaison Group for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation 
DATE LOCATION HIGHLIGHTS 
1998 (May 13-14) Beijing JLG officially established 
1999 Washington * 
2000 (June 18-20) Beijing Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement 
signed (Allows the two sides to begin 
sharing information and forensic 
evidence in criminal investigations)77 
2005 (February 23-25) Beijing Expert groups on 
fugitives/repatriation, computer 
crimes, and anticorruption established 
2006 (May) Washington Expert group on IPR established 
2007 (June 13-14) Beijing FBI offers to provide security 
assistance to PRC for 2008 Beijing 
Summer Olympics78 
*Information not available. 
Source: Author’s interviews with JLG participants, 28 March-2 February 2007; media reports. 
 
Three expert groups- fugitives and repatriation, computer crimes, and 
anticorruption- were created in 2005.  In 2006, at U.S. initiative, an expert group on 
intellectual property rights enforcement was added.  The expert groups are charged with 
ongoing implementation of law enforcement goals set forth in the plenary session, and 
the groups also are responsible for facilitating increased information sharing by the two 
sides in the various issues represented. Participants in the expert groups from the U.S. 
side are drawn from multiple agencies.  For example, the Department of Homeland 
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Security and the FBI account for U.S. representation in the expert group on fugitives and 
repatriations.    
In addition, some agencies from the two sides hold formal bilateral meetings 
outside the auspices of the JLG plenary meetings or expert group meetings.  Since 2004, 
a working group comprising FBI and MPS representatives have met annually to evaluate 
progress in (and identify opportunities for improvement in) information sharing on 
counterterrorism and transnational organized crime matters, while a working group of 
officials from the DEA and the MPS Narcotics Control Commission meets yearly for the 
same purpose of improving information sharing in international narcotics 
investigations.79 
The stationing of full-time personnel as liaisons in the respective countries has 
expanded dramatically since the formation of the JLG.  From one DEA agent and one 
INS agent in 1998, the total of U.S. law enforcement-related personnel in Beijing grew to 
around 20 by 2007, including persons from FBI, Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE, established in 2003 as a successor to INS), Department 
of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and Department of Justice, as well as DEA.  
Meanwhile, the Chinese law enforcement liaison contingent in the Washington embassy 
grew as well.  A police liaison office was established in 2004, and now the MPS posts 
three liaison officers in Washington.  The PRC law enforcement liaison office in 
                                                 
 
 
79 Author’s interview with Department of Homeland Security official, 1 March 2007; author’s interview 
with Ministry of Public Security officials, 1 March 2007. 
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Washington, while much smaller than the U.S. law enforcement liaison presence in 
Beijing, is the largest overseas MPS presence.80 
 The participation of several key agencies in the JLG has led to a string of visits by 
high-profile law enforcement leaders- including leaders in anti-smuggling enforcement- 
from both countries in the years since the group’s establishment.  Commissioner Doris 
Meissner led a team of U.S. immigration and law enforcement officials in July 2000 to 
Beijing and Fujian.  PRC and U.S. law enforcement faced the challenge of countering 
evolving methods from human smugglers.  By 2000, far fewer illegal immigrants were 
now attempting the transoceanic journey to the U.S. on board overcrowded trawlers. The 
most common ways of passage to the U.S. for smuggled Chinese by 2000 were overland 
journeys through Russia and Europe before connecting by air to the U.S.; or through 
Southeast Asia by land, then by air to Latin America where they remained for four or five 
months, and from there overland into the U.S.  In addition to the land routes, a rapidly 
growing number of Chinese were using fake passports to fly directly from Asia to U.S.  
The U.S. expected to repatriate 4,000 undocumented Chinese arriving by air in the U.S. 
in 2000, as compared to only 1,000 seaborne travelers returned in 1999.81  The meetings 
between PRC and U.S. immigration enforcement authorities in July 2000 reached 
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agreements for the U.S. officers to train PRC counterparts to detect and prevent 
document fraud.82   
Meissner also sought to improve bilateral cooperation on repatriations of illegal 
migrants.  This was to be accomplished through the establishment of standard procedures 
to govern the repatriation process.  According to Meissner, cooperation from the PRC to 
allow the repatriation of its nationals had been uneven and sporadic, coming occurring 
irregularly rather than on the basis of agreed-upon processes between governments.  
Meissner remarked to the author that although international norms of diplomacy called 
for the PRC to repatriate Chinese nationals who had immigrated illegally to the U.S., 
cooperation from the PRC on repatriations occurred only haltingly.83 
During the George W. Bush presidency, one of the most visible aspects of Sino-
U.S. law enforcement relations has been an unprecedented number of bilateral meetings 
involving high-level U.S. and PRC law enforcement officials.   Since 2002, three cabinet-
level officials and the director of the FBI- all with law enforcement portfolios- have 
traveled to the PRC, and the top-ranking law enforcement official in the PRC has held 
talks with U.S. counterparts in Washington.  Agreements reached in these meetings have 
played an important part in the evolution of bilateral law enforcement cooperation on 
multiple issues, one of which has been human smuggling. 
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Attorney General John Ashcroft’s October 2002 trip to Beijing had two chief 
purposes: consulting with State Councilor Luo Gan and Minister of Justice Zhang Fusen 
on bilateral counterterrorism efforts, and presiding over the formal opening of an FBI 
Legal Attaché (Legat) office in the U.S. Embassy.  The Legat office, staffed by one FBI 
agent, would promote cooperation with PRC counterparts through information sharing 
and coordinating investigations, while also following leads in China- contingent upon 
approval from the PRC Ministry of Public Security- for FBI offices in the U.S.  The work 
of the Legat would support the Sino-U.S. counterterrorism partnership, and the new 
office was also intended enable the U.S. to work more closely and effectively with PRC 
authorities to fight organized and transnational crimes, including money laundering, 
narcotics, and human smuggling.84  More than 40 FBI Legat offices were operating 
worldwide, and the Beijing office would be the first of its kind in the PRC.  Approval for 
the office’s opening had been formally granted by the PRC during a February 2002 
meeting in Beijing between President Bush and PRC President Jiang Zemin, indicating 
the office’s importance to high-level leaders. 
Talks in Beijing in April 2004 between FBI Director Robert Mueller and PRC 
Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang, as well as with officials from the Ministry of 
State Security, also focused on issues of terrorism and international crime.  Agreements- 
the specifics of which were not publicly disclosed- were reached to enhance bilateral 
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cooperation in investigations in international crime and counterterrorism.85  Though 
counterterrorism cooperation was the top item on the agenda for the meetings, such 
cooperation touched on issues related to human smuggling; for example, persons crossing 
borders for purposes of illegal migration may also be crossing borders for terrorist 
purposes. 
Two days before Mueller’s arrival in Beijing, U.S. authorities had repatriated Yu 
Zhendong, a fugitive accused by the PRC of embezzling $485 million from a Bank of 
China sub-branch in Guangdong.86  This marked the first repatriation of a corrupt PRC 
official who had absconded to the U.S.  Mueller offered assurance that despite the lack of 
an extradition treaty between the U.S. and the PRC corrupt absconders would not find 
safe refuge in the U.S.87  
A leading priority for U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for his talks in 
Beijing in November 2005 was to encourage PRC law enforcement leaders to strengthen 
criminal enforcement of laws protecting intellectual property rights (IPR).  In meetings 
with Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang, CCP Standing Committee Politburo 
member Luo Gan, and Jia Chunwang, the Procurator-General of the PRC, Gonzales 
called for an increase in the number of joint U.S.-PRC anti-piracy law enforcement 
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operations.  PRC media reports, while containing no details of the measures involved in 
the two agreements reached by the U.S. and PRC, did announce that the talks had 
resulted in concrete agreements to further bilateral work in the areas of counterterrorism, 
IPR violations, information sharing by law enforcement authorities, and training of 
security personnel. 88 
Michael Chertoff in April 2006 became the first Homeland Security Secretary to 
visit the PRC.  According to a U.S. Embassy spokeswoman and a Department of 
Homeland Security official, illegal Chinese immigration was the most important topic in 
Chertoff’s meetings with senior PRC leaders.89  In discussions with Luo Gan, Zhou 
Yongkang, and Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Chertoff pressed his counterparts to 
address the issue of illegal Chinese immigrants in the U.S. awaiting repatriation to the 
PRC.  Just over 39,000 Chinese in the U.S. at the time of Chertoff’s visit were under final 
orders of deportation by U.S. immigration authorities: legally, they could be deported at 
any time.  The problem, however, was that PRC authorities had not issued travel 
documents (necessary under U.S. law) to the U.S. to authorize the repatriation of the 
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Chinese to the PRC.  Until the issuance of the requisite documents, the U.S. would be 
unable not only to deport the aliens, but also to hold them in detention beyond 180 days.  
Court-ordered restrictions that prevent the detention of illegals for more than 180 days 
meant that only about 600 of the 39,000 were being held in U.S. facilities; the remaining 
38,000, though under removal orders, were living openly in the U.S.  
Reaching an agreement with the PRC to hasten the repatriation of illegal 
immigrants, remarked Chertoff before his travel to Beijing, was essential to deterring 
would-be human smugglers.90  From the standpoint of U.S. leaders, Beijing displayed an 
unparalleled lack of cooperation on the repatriation matter.  In an April 2006 Homeland 
Security Inspector General report on the detention and removal of illegal aliens in the 
U.S., the PRC was listed as the largest among eight countries classified as “blocking or 
inhibiting repatriation” of nationals who had been detained as unauthorized immigrants.  
The report cited the PRC for blocking repatriations by “imposing a slow and problematic 
travel document issuance process,” referring to the required documents that the U.S. had 
been unable to obtain.  As of June 2004, 136,000 illegal aliens under final orders for 
removal from the U.S. were citizens of countries that block or inhibit repatriations; 
73,000 of these illegal aliens were PRC citizens.91 
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In the Beijing discussions, Chertoff and PRC leaders reportedly worked out a 
framework to expedite the process by which Chinese in the U.S. illegally were 
repatriated.92  A senior official in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement said that 
the bilateral discussions had produced an agreement whereby the PRC government would 
accept a charter flight repatriation in May or June 2006 of 300 to 350 Chinese nationals- 
a “good first step,” in the U.S. official’s words, in to address the problem of the backlog 
of Chinese awaiting deportation from the U.S.93   Previous repatriations, according to 
U.S. officials, had been limited to individuals or pairs, traveling on commercial flights at 
U.S. expense. 94   
In its press statements, the PRC Foreign Ministry restated its position that the 
government would accept repatriations of illegal Chinese from the U.S. only after 
verifying the identity and residence of each migrant.95  This verification process entailed 
comparing the name, birth date, and hometown information collected by U.S. 
investigators against the PRC’s household registration (hukou) records.  Nearly all hukou 
records in the PRC are now stored electronically.96  However, according to both PRC and 
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U.S. officials, incomplete information received from U.S. investigators often necessitated 
that PRC officials personally visit the hometowns or families of migrants in order to 
confirm the migrants’ identities.  Because many of the migrants came from remote rural 
areas, the identity verification process could become quite time-consuming.97  On 28 June 
2006, the first-ever repatriation of illegal Chinese aliens to be carried out by charter flight 
from the U.S. transported 119 PRC nationals from El Paso to Fuzhou.98   
One month after the charter flight repatriation, PRC Minister of Public Security 
Zhou Yongkang arrived in the U.S. for follow-up meetings with Gonzales, Chertoff, and 
Mueller on the issues covered during their previous meetings in Beijing, including 
counterterrorism, IPR enforcement, counternarcotics, and money laundering.  This time, 
not only Chertoff, but also Stephen Hadley, National Security Advisor to President Bush, 
raised the issue of repatriations of illegal immigrants again to Zhou.  No reported 
agreements were reached to further expediting or streamlining procedures for future 
repatriations.99  Since the actual number of deportees on the June 2006 charter flight- 
119- represented fewer than half of the previously agreed upon figure of 300 to 350, it is 
likely that Hadley’s involvement was intended to reflect growing concern from the 
highest levels of the Bush Administration.   
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 Clearly, both sides have, since 1997, placed emphasized the development of more 
cooperative law enforcement relations.  Nevertheless, bilateral agreement and 
coordination on the repatriations remains elusive. What explains the ongoing difficulties 
in establishing effective deterrence to human smuggling through regular repatriations?  
The following chapter discusses factors responsible for shaping the progress of bilateral 
cooperation against human smuggling. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR ADVANCING AND 
OBSTRUCTING SINO-U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION 
AGAINST HUMAN SMUGGLING 
 
This chapter presents factors that have been most influential in shaping the 
evolution of Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation against human smuggling.  The first 
section discusses the means by which formal bilateral law enforcement institutions have 
advanced cooperation on human smuggling.  Next, the effect on law enforcement 
relations of changes in the macroclimate of Sino-U.S. relations is explained.  For this 
analysis, a change in the macroclimate of bilateral relations is defined as the emergence 
of high-level conflict or the convergence of high-level interests that result from high-
profile events.  Two cases- high level efforts by both sides in 1997 to improve broader 
Sino-U.S. relations, and the convergence of U.S. PRC and counterterrorism interests in 
the aftermath of September 11- are analyzed in order to illustrate the effect that changes 
in the macroclimate of bilateral relations have on law enforcement cooperation, including 
cooperation to combat human smuggling.  In the third section below, the undermining of 
law enforcement cooperation by an ineffective repatriation-based deterrent against human 
smuggling is examined.  A brief review of U.S. immigration enforcement policies is 
presented in order to spotlight the precise difficulties that the U.S. has encountered in the 
case of repatriating Chinese illegal immigrants.   Drawing from the interviews, the 
sources of these difficulties are then discussed.  Finally, conclusions and policy 
recommendations follow the analysis. 
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The effect of shifts in the macroclimate of Sino-U.S. relations: High-level moves 
toward cooperation in the broader bilateral relationship positively influence law 
enforcement relations 
The macroclimate of U.S.-PRC relations has at times been extremely influential 
in helping to shape the nature and extent of bilateral law enforcement cooperation, 
namely in instances where sudden high-profile events have effected a rapid change in the 
nature of high-level bilateral relations.  The effect of such shifts on law enforcement 
cooperation is straightforward.  If the change brings about a crisis between the two 
nations, law enforcement relations are adversely affected by the fallout from above.  If, 
however, the change in the macroclimate of bilateral relations presents urgent 
opportunities for high-level Sino-U.S. cooperation, the overall value of cooperative law 
enforcement relations may receive a considerable boost.  Since 1997, the effect on 
bilateral law enforcement cooperation (including work on human smuggling) from 
sudden shifts in the macroclimate of Sino-U.S. relations has been visible in four 
instances.  In two cases, the May 1999 NATO bombing of the PRC Embassy in 
Yugoslavia, and the April 2001 midair collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 plane and a 
PRC J-8 Fighter, Sino-U.S. diplomatic crises adversely affected Sino-U.S. law 
enforcement cooperation.  In the other two cases, high-level moves to stress shared 
interests in the relationship served as positive influences on bilateral law enforcement 
cooperation.  In the first of these latter two cases, efforts in 1997 by the leaders of both 
sides to move the U.S.-PRC relationship from deepening conflict to cooperation fostered 
great progress in bilateral law enforcement cooperation.  In the second case, the aftermath 
of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., converging U.S. and PRC interests 
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in counterterrorism were instrumental in bringing about a newfound commitment by both 
sides to achieving increasingly cooperative law enforcement relations.  These latter two 
cases are examined below.  
A review of the largely troubled course of Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation 
between 1988 and 1997 helps to highlight the effect on law enforcement relations of the 
1997 high-level moves at improving bilateral relations.  One particular incident in U.S.-
PRC law enforcement contact near the beginning of the 1988 to 1997 period adversely 
affected the entire context of bilateral law enforcement efforts.  In 1988, the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration and the Chinese Ministry of Public Security broke a 
smuggling ring responsible for transporting heroin from Shanghai to the West Coast of 
the U.S.  When arrested while attempting to board a flight to San Francisco, the 
smugglers were found to be hiding small bags of heroin inside goldfish, hence the case 
became known as the “Goldfish case.”100  This case marked the first cooperative effort 
between U.S. and PRC authorities in a criminal case.101  In December 1989, PRC 
authorities took the extraordinary step of sending one of those arrested in China, Wang 
Zongxiao, to the U.S. to testify in the heroin smuggling trial of three men in a U.S. 
District Court in San Francisco.  In February 1990, the witness Wang claimed political 
asylum in the U.S., and a federal court eventually blocked his return to China.102 
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The PRC was outraged by the events, A Foreign Ministry spokesman called U.S. 
District Judge William Orrick’s agreement to hear Wang’s case a “wanton violation of 
China’s judicial sovereignty in an attempt to grant political asylum to a proven criminal.”  
China would no longer send any witnesses to the U.S. to assist the U.S. in similar cases, 
the spokesman said.  The U.S., according to the spokesman, was “utterly defying basic 
international laws” by refusing to return the suspect to the PRC.103  As one U.S. official 
accurately characterized the Chinese anger, “The Chinese went out on a limb and it blew 
up in their faces.”104  The events of the Wang affair from the Goldfish case caused a 
deep, lingering irritation among Chinese leaders toward the U.S.105 After more than six 
years in detention, Wang was allowed to go free in the U.S. in 1996.106 
According to one former high-ranking State Department official and National 
Security Council (NSC) staff member, the Goldfish case cast a cloud that persisted 
through 1997 over Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation not just in narcotics 
investigations, but in all fields- including human smuggling.107  What had seemed like an 
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opportune case on which the U.S. and PRC could begin building cooperative efforts 
instead fell apart and caused such collaboration to whither.  
In 1997, while Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation remained at a standstill, 
the broader bilateral relationship had been strained by one crisis after since the beginning 
of the decade: the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, U.S. linkage of 
Most Favored Nation status to the PRC’s human rights record from 1993 to 1994, and the 
confrontation between PRC and U.S. in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996.  PRC 
leaders, fearing that a continuing deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations may have drastic 
consequences for China, decided in 1997 to substantially change course and actively 
pursue improved relations with the U.S.108   
At the same time, U.S. leaders were also seeking to repair long-stressed Sino-U.S. 
relations. Jeffrey Bader, a member of the NSC at the time, was closely involved in the 
planning for the October 1997 summit meeting between PRC President Jiang Zemin and 
U.S. President Bill Clinton in Washington.  The bilateral Sino-U.S. relationship had been 
“in the dumps,” most recently as a result of the accelerated deterioration of relations that 
occurred in the wake of the near-confrontation in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996.109  
The Clinton team was searching for areas outside of business on which to build 
cooperation.   Although a legacy of non-cooperation on law enforcement matters between 
the U.S. and PRC persisted from the Goldfish case, there were signs that the field may be 
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ripe for renewed Sino-U.S. cooperative efforts.  In the Clinton-Jiang summit, the two 
leaders agreed to establish the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on Law Enforcement 
Cooperation.  The inclusion of the JLG on the agenda for the summit was, said Bader, the 
first step toward rebuilding the sizeable damage to bilateral law enforcement relations 
that had been done by the Goldfish case.110  The formal establishment of the JLG and its 
first meeting came in Beijing in May 1998, with the two sides holding initial discussions 
on cooperation in fields such as combating international organized crime, narcotics 
trafficking, human smuggling, counterfeiting, and money laundering.111  Thus, changes in 
the macroclimate of Sino-U.S. relations in 1997- resulting, in this case, from efforts by 
both sides to move the broader bilateral relationship away from deepening conflict and 
toward cooperation- carried a positive influence on Sino-U.S. law enforcement 
cooperation. 
Bilateral law enforcement cooperation, in the view of three U.S. officials involved 
with the JLG, has become less politicized since the creation of the JLG.112  Nevertheless, 
such cooperation remains politicized to a significant degree; that is, the extent of PRC 
participation- or nonparticipation- in the JLG closely reflects the depth of political 
support from Beijing for cooperative Sino-U.S. law enforcement relations.  Naturally, 
then, when political support in Beijing for cooperation with the U.S. runs low, one effect 
will be a sharply reduced level of PRC participation in the JLG.    
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This view would explain the PRC’s non-participation in the JLG after two events 
triggered crises in Sino-U.S. relations in 1999 and 2001.  First, in May 1999, a U.S. B-2 
stealth bomber on a sortie in the NATO air campaign over Kosovo bombed the PRC 
Embassy in Belgrade.  The U.S. had improperly labeled the embassy on a targeting map 
as the headquarters office for Serbian military procurement.113  The bombing resulted in 
widespread outpouring of popular anti-U.S. rage in the PRC, and PRC leaders refused to 
believe President Clinton’s insistence that the bombing had been accidental.114  
According to four U.S. officials who take part in JLG meetings, the PRC ceased 
participation in the JLG framework for over a year after the bombing.   Not until General 
Barry McCaffrey, director of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, visited 
China in June 2000- with a delegation from the Department of Defense, DEA, and the 
Coast Guard- did high-level bilateral law enforcement dialogue resume.115 
The second event to trigger a bilateral crisis was the midair collision of a U.S. EP-
3 spy plane with a PRC J-8 jet on 1 April 2001.116  After an emergency landing at a 
Chinese airbase, the U.S. Navy crew of 24 men and women were detained for 11 days on 




113 Steven Lee Myers, “Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame,” New York Times, 17 April 
2000. 
 
114 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 59-61. 
 
115 “China, United States to Step Up Cooperation in War on Drugs,” Agence France-Presse, 19 June 2000; 
“U.S. Drug Policy Maker Comes to China to Fight Trafficking,” Associated Press, 17 June 2000; “General 
McCaffey Holds News Conference on Drug Use in China,” Federal Document Clearing House, 16 June 
2000; Matt Forney, “U.S. Offers China Help Against Drug Smuggling,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 June 
2000; “China, U.S. to Further Cooperate in Cracking Down on Drugs,” Xinhua, 19 June 2000, Factiva; Erik 
Eckholm, “U.S. and China Agree on Steps to Fight Drugs,” New York Times, 20 June 2000. 
 
116 Elisabeth Rosenthal and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Plane in China After it Collides with Chinese Jet,” New 
York Times, 2 April 2001. 
 55 
Hainan Island before their release by the PRC.117  Just as it had done in response to the 
embassy bombing, the PRC again effectively halted its participation in law enforcement 
cooperation with the U.S.  Sino-U.S. law enforcement relations sank to their “low water 
mark” in the months that followed the EP-3 incident, in the words of a Homeland 
Security official involved in the JLG processes.118  When high-level incidents such as 
these occur, explained a Justice Department JLG participant with a long history of 
involvement in bilateral law enforcement ties, law enforcement cooperation between the 
PRC and the U.S. “shuts down.”119 
Most germane to the present condition of Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation 
is the shift that followed the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  Counterterrorism 
quickly emerged as a critically important mutual interest between China and the U.S, and 
this common ground served as the basis for new Sino-U.S. security cooperation.  Because 
law enforcement agencies play a central role in counterterrorism efforts, shared Sino-U.S 
counterterrorism interests caused closer bilateral law enforcement cooperation.  
Moreover, both counterterrorism and anti-smuggling work involve controlling flows 
illicit flows of persons across borders.  Thus, bilateral counterterrorism cooperation since 
September 11 has stimulated closer cooperation by the U.S. and the PRC to combat 
human smuggling. 
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 President Jiang Zemin phoned President Bush on September 12 to express his 
condolences for the attack on America, and Jiang informed Bush that China was prepared 
to cooperate with the U.S. to combat terrorism.120  In the United Nations Security 
Council, China voted in support of Resolution 1368, an unequivocal condemnation of the 
attacks.121  Appearing at a joint news conference with Jiang in Shanghai in October 2001, 
Bush reported that the China would assist the U.S. war on terrorism through intelligence 
sharing and terrorist finance interdiction.122   
Beijing’s interest in counterterrorism derived largely from leadership’s perception 
of internal and external threats posed to China by terrorism.  The most potent domestic 
terror threat, in the central government’s view, has come from militant separatists in 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.123   A state media report in January 2002 reported 
that terrorists in western China had been responsible for over 200 “terror incidents” 
inside Xinjiang from 1990 to 2001, resulting in 162 deaths and 440 injuries.124   The 
leading external threat to China from terrorism involves Muslims in the Central Asian 
countries bordering the PRC.  In Beijing’s eyes, interaction between the internal and 
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external threats could be explosive in force, presenting a direct challenge to the CCP’s 
hold on power.125  
Thus, the PRC, like the U.S., had a deeply held interest in combating Islamic 
terrorism.  Chinese cooperation with the U.S. in its war on terrorism offered two clear 
benefits: an opportunity to improve Sino-American relations, and justification for taking 
firm action against Uighur separatists in Xinjiang.  
The emergence of common ground between the U.S. and PRC on 
counterterrorism has brought law enforcement concerns to a place of great importance in 
bilateral relations since September 11.  Because the work of counterterrorism draws 
heavily on law enforcement methods, an unprecedented number of bilateral meetings 
between top officials in law enforcement-related circles from the PRC and the U.S. have 
been held since 2001 to discuss issues and concerns related to the War on Terror.  Six 
such meetings that were earlier described in detail include the December 2001 visit to 
Beijing by State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Francis X. Taylor; Attorney 
General John Ashcroft’s October 2002 visit to Beijing; a visit to Beijing by FBI Director 
Robert Mueller in April 2004; a visit to Beijing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in 
November 2005; a trip to Beijing by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff in 
April 2006; and a visit to Washington by PRC Minister of Public Security Zhou 
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Yongkang in July 2006.   A broad range of law enforcement issues have figured 
prominently in the agendas of these meetings.   
The subject of counterterrorism did not merely reshape the agendas for these 
discussions among senior law enforcement leaders from both sides, as if such visits and 
meetings were already occurring before this new shared interest in fighting terror 
emerged.  Rather, jointly held counterterrorism concerns since 2001 have prompted 
bilateral meetings and exchanges whose occurrences would have otherwise been highly 
unlikely.  In fact, the visits have included several historic “firsts”:  Ashcroft, Mueller, and 
Chertoff became the first Attorney General, FBI Director, and Homeland Security 
Secretary, respectively, to visit the PRC, while Zhou Yongkang became the first PRC 
Minister of Public Security to visit the U.S.126, counterterrorism issues occupied a central 
purpose in all the meetings. 
These exchanges have played a critical role in the restoration of Sino-U.S. law 
enforcement cooperation since 2001.  Before the counterterrorism-driven exchanges 
began, law enforcement cooperation had been at a low point and the JLG had been in 
hiatus, according to one U.S. participant in the mechanism’s yearly meetings.127 The 
inclusion of law enforcement issues (issues in addition to counterterrorism) on the 
agendas of these meetings between policymakers from the two sides has given new 
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prominence to the area in bilateral relations, thereby stimulating Sino-U.S. law 
enforcement cooperation. 
One example of the profoundly positive effect that these counterterrorism-driven 
contacts have had on broader bilateral law enforcement cooperation involves the case of 
the establishment of the FBI Legal Attaché office in the U.S. Embassy, Beijing.  
Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. made repeated efforts to obtain Chinese permission to 
open an FBI Legal Attaché office in Beijing. The responsibilities of such an office would 
include coordinating international investigations with other FBI offices, following leads 
for domestic U.S. investigations, effecting information sharing, and leading FBI training 
classes for foreign law enforcement officers.128  In 1996, FBI and State Department 
officials confirmed that the Bureau had begun negotiations with the PRC Ministry of 
Public Security over the Bureau’s request to post an officer to the U.S. Embassy in 
Beijing.129 A Deputy Assistant FBI Director testified in April 1997 that the proposal for a 
joint FBI-DEA office in Beijing received approval from the U.S. State Department, U.S. 
Embassy, Department of Justice, and Congress.  When, however, the U.S. Embassy 
sought final approval from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reply was, “Not at 
this time.”130   
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A former American diplomat who was closely involved with U.S.-PRC relations 
attributed the refusal of the request for a joint office to the PRC’s views of the two U.S. 
agencies involved in the request, the DEA and the FBI.  In the case of the DEA, PRC 
anger over the earlier-discussed Goldfish case had persisted since a U.S. judge agreed to 
hear Chinese prisoner Wang Zongxiao’s asylum request in the U.S. in 1990.  In the 
PRC’s view, the U.S. had betrayed China’s cooperation on drug matters by refusing to 
send Wang back to China.  China’s position was straightforward: bilateral antidrug 
cooperation could not resume until Wang was returned to China to face charges.131 
Regarding the FBI, in the diplomat’s view, the PRC was deeply suspicious of the Bureau, 
fearing that a Beijing Embassy office’s real purpose would involve covert intelligence 
gathering.132 A Hong Kong newspaper quoted a PRC dissident and China scholars as 
saying that the PRC viewed the FBI as a “spy” agency and was therefore unlikely to grant 
permission for an FBI office in Beijing.133   
A joint statement issued by Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin at their October 1997 
summit meeting in Washington announced that the U.S. and PRC would station 
counternarcotics officers in each other’s embassies.  As a result, the U.S. opened a DEA 
office in Beijing in 1998, and the Ministry of Public Security stationed a police liaison in 
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Washington that same year.134  Still, however, the request for an FBI office was not 
approved.135  When Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, director of the White House Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), met with PRC officials in Beijing in June 2000, 
he again put forth the U.S. proposal to post an FBI agent to a Legal Attaché office in 
Beijing.  The PRC, however, did not immediately respond to Gen. McCaffrey’s 
request.136   
When, in the context of post-September 11 counterterrorism talks the request was 
next presented, the PRC was significantly more receptive to the possibility of an FBI 
office in Beijing.  Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, State Department Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, traveled to Beijing in December 2001 for two days of talks with PRC 
officials.  Taylor and his delegation of officials from the FBI, Department of Defense, 
and Treasury Department met with top officials from the Foreign Ministry, People’s 
Liberation Army, Ministry of Public Security, and People’s Bank of China to arrange 
ongoing consultations, and to set up plans for a bilateral financial counterterrorism 
working group.  As he outlined the swiftness with which the PRC government had 
replied to U.S. requests for assistance since the September 11 terrorist attacks, Taylor 
cited as an example of that swiftness the reply to yet another U.S. proposal to establish an 
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FBI Legal Attaché office in Beijing.  According to Taylor, the PRC had agreed to give 
“positive consideration” to the U.S. request that had been presented that very day, 6 
December 2001.137  In contrast, after Gen. McCaffrey raised the question to PRC officials 
in June 2000, the request had simply lingered without a reply for 18 months.138  As 
Taylor noted, an FBI office in Beijing, if allowed by the PRC government to open, would 
strengthen the efficiency of bilateral law enforcement cooperation. 
Only two months later, when President George W. Bush came to Beijing in 
February 2002 for a working visit with President Jiang Zemin, the PRC announced that 
the request for the Legal Attaché office had been approved.139  In October that same year, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft visited Beijing for talks with PRC Minister of Public 
Security Luo Gan and Justice Minister Zhang Fusen that focused mainly on 
counterterrorism issues.  While in Beijing, Ashcroft announced the formal establishment 
of the FBI office in the Beijing embassy.  Although the shared Sino-U.S. 
counterterrorism interests were the key factor in determining the PRC’s hasty approval of 
the Legal Attaché office, the new office’s scope would also encompass law enforcement 
issues beyond terrorism, including organized crime, transnational crime, and other 
unspecified “threats to the rule of law.” The cooperative work on countering terrorism 
had shown PRC and U.S. leaders, Ashcroft said, opportunities to extend such productive 
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cooperation to focus on these other types of international crimes. In his statement to 
reporters at the opening of the Legal Attaché office, Ashcroft stated that he saw the new 
office as a core ingredient of not only a potent U.S.-China counterterrorism capacity, but 
of a prosperous law enforcement partnership that would target money laundering, migrant 
smuggling, narcotics, and other transnational crimes.140  Although Ashcroft did not 
discuss specifics of how U.S.-China law enforcement would occur, his strong support for 
an increasingly cooperative bilateral law enforcement relationship was clear and explicit.  
Altogether, the U.S. had wanted an FBI Legal Attaché office in Beijing for more 
than 10 years before the 2002 opening.141  After years of refusal and silence, the request 
was well received and granted almost immediately. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu 
Jianchao indicated the sensitivity with which the PRC viewed the matter when he 
responded to a question about the new office that the office  “is not the establishment of 
an FBI office in China, but rather inside the U.S. Embassy in China.”142  The magnitude 
of the change of official PRC views on the presence of the Legal Attaché office was even 
more visible in April 2004, when Robert Mueller became the first FBI Director to visit 
China.  A key purpose of Mueller’s time in the PRC was to permanently open the 
office.143 
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The new Sino-U.S. common ground on counterterrorism overrode the importance 
of the PRC’s deeply-held suspicions and concerns, creating a political context that made 
possible PRC acceptance of such a sensitive, long-rejected proposal.  Thus, by enabling 
the location of an FBI office in Beijing, the urgency of counterterrorism concerns 
strengthened the likelihood of effective Sino-U.S. cooperation on a broad range of law 
enforcement issues. 
Another example of how Sino-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation, rooted in the 
post-September 11 change in the relational macroclimate, has brought a restoration of 
broader law enforcement relations has been through helping to rejuvenate and to shape 
the agenda of the Sino-U.S. Joint Liaison Group (JLG) for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation.  The interactions and working agreements between high-level law 
enforcement leaders from the U.S. and the PRC have necessitated, as a JLG participant 
from the U.S. explained, that bureaucrats in the JLG operate with an increased 
strategically-driven (and, correspondingly, less tactically-driven) focus- thereby raising 
the incentive to participants on both sides of the JLG to break bilateral impasses or 
overcome misunderstandings.  As a result, improved effectiveness in bilateral 
cooperation against human smuggling and other crimes follows.144 
The JLG had, of course, been created with the intent of facilitating regular 
dialogue and cooperation between U.S. and PRC law enforcement agencies.  When the 
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embassy bombing and the EP-3 collision led to a halt in JLG action, the envisioned forum 
for dialogue instead became a dormant organ with no momentum.145   
Sino-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation after September 11 led to high-level 
discussions, as discussed above, about many types of law enforcement cooperation.  As a 
consequence- whether direct or secondary- of these high-level talks, new bilateral 
initiatives have been launched, and agreements have been reached, all with the affect of 
advancing Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation.  The need for action on these 
agreements, according to participants, has necessitated renewed interactions between 
participants in the formerly inactive JLG.  According to a Justice Department official 
involved in the JLG meetings, the spillover effect of counterterrorism cooperation was 
such that in his view, Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation and the JLG are best 
understood in terms of “pre-September 11” and “post-September 11.” 146   
The July 2006 visit to the U.S. by PRC State Councilor and Minister of Public 
Security Zhou Yongkang offers a telling example of how high-level contacts since 
September 11 have revived the function and importance of the JLG as a key vehicle for 
broad Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation.  In Zhou’s three days of meetings with 
leading U.S. officials, he signed six Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between PRC 
and U.S. law enforcement agencies, all aimed at strengthening PRC-U.S. law 
enforcement cooperation.  Seven months later, a PRC official was still working on the 
follow up from the Zhou visit, implementing the MOUs that were signed and trying to 
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develop more working mechanisms- within and outside the JLG- to follow the 
agreements reached in the MOUs147 
In effect, the shared PRC and U.S. interest in counterterrorism since September 
11 has given law enforcement cooperation an important place in high-level bilateral 
discussions.  Problems discussed and agreements reached in such meetings have 
advanced counterterrorism cooperation and broader areas of law enforcement 
cooperation. The revived effectiveness of the JLG can be attributed in large part to the 
new basis for Sino-U.S. cooperation against counterterrorism. This trajectory of increased 
effectiveness contrasts sharply with the standstill in law enforcement relations that 
existed prior to the terrorist attacks.  Thus, the convergence of U.S. and PRC 
counterterrorism interests since September 11 has been and continues to be a driver of 
improved bilateral cooperation in law enforcement affairs, and the climate of deepening 
law enforcement relations creates fertile ground for growing cooperation against human 
smuggling. 
 As long as counterterrorism remains an overriding common interest between the 
two sides, then Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation should continue to prosper and 
expand for the reasons described in this section.  If and when, however, counterterrorism 
interests cease being a significant shared interest between the two sides, it is possible that 
law bilateral enforcement cooperation may experience stagnation or even setbacks. 
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The creation of formal bilateral institutions for law enforcement cooperation 
The development of institutionalized mechanisms for bilateral law enforcement 
cooperation has been vitally important in fostering cooperation on human smuggling 
issues.   These mechanisms have assisted cooperation in two ways. First, the collective 
scope of these institutional mechanisms ensures that human smuggling is addressed not 
as a stand-alone matter, but rather as one among a range of issues on which the two sides 
seek cooperation.  Second, these coordination mechanisms have facilitated the 
development of mutual familiarity and trust-based relationships between U.S. and PRC 
law enforcement personnel. 
Bilateral institutional mechanisms created for the purpose of fostering Sino-U.S. 
law enforcement cooperation have proliferated since first emerging in 1997.  The most 
well known of these structures is the Sino-U.S. Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement 
Cooperation (JLG), but other mechanisms for cooperation and coordination exist.  These 
other mechanisms include: annual bilateral working group meetings between the MPS 
and the FBI regarding counterterrorism and transnational organized crime; annual 
meetings between the MPS and DEA on drug enforcement matters of bilateral interest; as 
of 2006, cooperative agreements between the MPS and FBI on exchanges of law 
enforcement personnel; MPS and ICE on combating illegal migration; PRC Narcotics 
Control Commission and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) on counternarcotics cooperation.148  Additionally, the PRC and the U.S. work 
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together in multilateral cooperative law enforcement mechanisms, including the 
Container Security Initiative and the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum.149  Together, 
these mechanisms have created a multi-issue field for bilateral interaction.  As a result, 
bilateral contact on the human smuggling issue benefits a broader context of cooperative 
efforts between U.S. and PRC law enforcement authorities. 
In the absence of a formal mechanism for addressing bilateral concerns in 
multiple law enforcement issue areas, human smuggling was addressed either in special 
visits (such as a 1994 delegation of INS and State Department officials that traveled to 
Beijing for talks on the emerging threat of seaborne migrant smuggling) or in talks 
between high-level policymakers (such as a 1994 meeting between Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen) in which discussions focused on 
principles without discussing finer points and operational matters.  Such irregularity of 
dialogue left little possibility for a convergence of U.S. and PRC views on human 
smuggling issues up to 1997.  A current State Department official pointed out that prior 
to 1998, the year the JLG was established, the U.S. was unable to succeed in making a 
case for “why human smuggling should matter to the Chinese,” primarily because almost 
no opportunity for ongoing dialogue or interaction on the matter existed.  In short, U.S.-
PRC cooperation on human smuggling before 1997-1998, coming as it did in a broader 
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context of non-cooperation on bilateral law enforcement issues, was “uneven, at best” in 
the words of former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner.150 
The inception of mechanisms for bilateral law enforcement cooperation in 1997 
created structures and fora for regular Sino-U.S. collaboration and communication on 
multiple law enforcement issues.  The most notable of these mechanisms, the JLG, as 
mentioned above, initially encompassed the issues of international organized crime, 
narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, counterfeiting, and money laundering.151 
Collectively, measures taken in 1997 and 1998- the establishment of the JLG, the posting 
of U.S. immigration officers to China, and the exchange of counternarcotics officers- had 
the effect of placing human smuggling in a portfolio as one of several issues to which 
each side had allocated personnel and resources to address with the other side.  A 
Department of Homeland Security official whose involvement in bilateral anti-human 
smuggling work dates from the mid-1980s, explained how the expanding issue scope of 
the JLG continues to bring about more effective bilateral cooperation against human 
smuggling.  As the JLG’s focus encompasses a growing number of law enforcement 
issues, the deepening level of commitment by both sides has brought about out greater 
participation in the JLG meetings by decisionmakers and persons close to 
decisionmakers.152 Thus, by empowering participants in JLG meetings, the expanding 
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scope of the JLG itself positively affects cooperation on discrete issues, including human 
smuggling. 
According to two participants in JLG consultations on human smuggling matters, 
ongoing interaction through the JLG between officials from the two sides has enabled 
bilateral work on human smuggling (and on other issues as well) to move from a myopic 
focus on short-term issues and problems- the norm prior to the establishment of the JLG- 
to a longer-term focus in which expert group meetings and working group meetings 
enable specialists from the two sides to develop common understandings of transnational 
criminal issues.  For example, PRC and U.S. participants in the human smuggling 
working group have begun to work together to produce joint studies and reports on 
human smuggling-related issues.153 
A second main way that institutional mechanisms have assisted bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation against human smuggling has been through the establishment of 
personal contacts.  Participation in meetings and working groups through these 
mechanisms have resulted in familiarity and increasingly close working relationships 
between U.S. and PRC law enforcement personnel.  Closer working relationships have in 
turn enabled cooperative work against all forms of law enforcement, including work on 
human smuggling.   
Before the JLG, each side’s unfamiliarity with the system and processes of the 
other side was a sizeable roadblock to effective cooperation. One interview subject who 
took part in negotiations with the Chinese regarding the interdiction of ships and the 
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return of illegal migrants in 1993 and 1994 reported that at that time, U.S. officials had 
no knowledge of the processes which the PRC followed in such situations.  After three 
days of negotiations in Beijing between a U.S. delegation from INS and the State 
Department and the PRC Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an 
understanding was finally reached by the two sides on the necessary legal processes that 
needed to occur in order for an agreement to be reached.154 
 The familiarity and understanding developed by the two sides through interactions 
within the JLG mechanism breeds trust among participants for individuals from the 
opposite side. By no means has trust been fully achieved through the JLG interactions. 
Rather, the initiation and development of trust-based relationships among JLG members 
is a learning process at work.  As one U.S. official who has been closely involved with 
the JLG commented, “Mutual confidence-building is a long, time-consuming process.”155  
Nevertheless, in interviews with the author, JLG participants from both sides shared the 
view that the development of personal connections and relationships within the JLG has 
been a very important factor in improved cooperation on human smuggling in the last 
decade. 
Sources of ineffective repatriation-based deterrence against human smuggling 
In the preceding chapter we saw that China and the U.S. have not succeeded in 
establishing and maintaining a credible repatriation-based deterrent to human smuggling.   
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The processes involved in repatriation (or, removal) do not fall entirely within the realm 
of law enforcement work. Judicial organs serve important functions in authorizing 
repatriations.  Despite the fact that repatriations are not the exclusive domain of law 
enforcement authorities, however, all interview subjects who take part in the JLG told the 
author that repatriations are the main problem issue affecting Sino-U.S. cooperation 
against human smuggling.  Cooperation against human smuggling, said one JLG 
participant, is a largely “straightforward matter.”156  Yet, discord between the two sides 
on the repatriation issue persists.   From the time that human smuggling from the PRC to 
the U.S. became highly visible in the first Clinton Administration, the two sides have 
been unable to work together to ensure a working system for the quick return of detained 
illegal immigrants. 
The presence or absence of a reliable deterrent has a clear effect on the success of 
bilateral law enforcement cooperation against human smuggling.  In order for a deterrent 
against human smuggling to work effectively, would-be illegal immigrants must believe 
that the probability for success is too low (or that probability for failure is too high), and 
the costs too great to justify such a risky venture.  By reducing the demand for human 
smuggling, therefore, a strong deterrent under supports the work of bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation.  In the presence weak or ineffective deterrent, meanwhile, the 
demand for human smuggling will rise.  An ineffective deterrent, then, serves to 
undermine the success of Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation against human 
smuggling. 
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The difficulties in establishing an effective deterrent against human smuggling 
and illegal immigration from the PRC to the U.S. have become especially visible since 
the introduction of a new border and immigration security strategy in the U.S. for fiscal 
year 2006.  An overview of the U.S. border control strategy is therefore instructive.  The 
first subsection below describes how, in accordance with the new U.S. border security 
policies, the processes of detention and removal are to be applied to illegal immigrants 
apprehended while attempting to cross into the United States between official ports of 
entry.  The subsection that follows, drawing on interviews conducted with U.S. and PRC 
officials, examines the application of the detention and removal process to illegal Chinese 
aliens, in order to highlight surface-level causes of the repatriation problems identified in 
the previous chapter.  The third section discusses underlying factors responsible for these 
problems.  These factors, it is argued, are root causes of ineffective deterrence against 
illegal Chinese immigration to the U.S. 
 
Expedited Removal of Aliens Entering the United States 
 
 In fiscal year 2004, agents of the United States Border Patrol (USBP) 
apprehended 1,158, illegal aliens attempting to cross into the U.S. between official points 
of entry.  More than 93 percent of these aliens were Mexican nationals.  The remainder of 
the apprehended illegals are classified by the USBP as “Other Than Mexican,” or 
OTM.157  Upon apprehension by USBP agents, almost all Mexicans are voluntarily 
returned across the border.  OTMs, however, cannot be returned to Mexico.  After 
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determination is made of the OTM’s country of origin, the alien is placed in the formal 
removal process.158 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 extends to the Attorney General 
(and now, to the Secretary of Homeland Security) the authority to detain any alien who 
has been designated for removal.159  Until 2006, however, a shortage of bed space in the 
detention facilities of the Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) of U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) necessitated that the majority of illegal aliens not 
requiring mandatory detention were issued notices-to-appear (NTA) before immigration 
judges, and were released on their own recognizance into the interior of the U.S.160 In 
July 2005, for example, 80 percent of all OTMs were released on account of a shortage of 
bed space.161  Most released aliens would fail to appear in immigration court for their 
scheduled removal hearings.  In fact, in fiscal year 2005, 60 percent of OTM aliens who 
had been released after apprehension failed to show in immigration court, and only 18 
percent of released aliens with final orders for removal actually left the U.S.162  
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 The Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a new border security and immigration 
strategy presented by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff in November 2005, 
called for an end to the practice of releasing aliens into the interior U.S. after the aliens 
had been designated for removal.163  In its place, Homeland Security would seek to 
achieve by the end of fiscal year 2006 a 100 percent “catch-and-return” rate, in which all 
apprehended aliens remained in detention while awaiting removal.164  To facilitate the 
accomplishment of this goal, Secretary Chertoff expanded the application of “Expedited 
Removal" to cover all points on the U.S.-Mexico border.  Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, Expedited Removal allows USBP officers to deny admission to and 
order removal of any alien arriving in the U.S. without proper documentation; the denial 
is not subject to further hearings or review, unless the alien indicates a fear of persecution 
or an intention to seek asylum.165  If the alien does seek asylum, he is interviewed by an 
asylum officer to determine if the alien’s claim meets the legal standard, set forth in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, of a “credible fear” of persecution.166  Those 
immigrants whose claims are determined to have merit are referred to a hearing before an 
immigration judge in the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).  If the request 
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for asylum is accepted by the judge, then the alien goes free; if not, the alien is ordered 
removed from the U.S.167   
The drive to reach a no-exceptions catch-and-return record also entailed 
expanding the capacity of U.S. detention facilities.  In addition, the cooperation of 
foreign governments was deemed critical to the success of the new strategy:  In order for 
the U.S. to remove an illegal alien to his country of origin (or to a third country), the 
government of that destination country must issue to the U.S. travel documents 
authorizing the illegal alien to be sent to that country. 168   
In July 2006, the Department of Homeland Security reported that the U.S. had 
achieved for the first time a 100 percent catch-and-return rate for OTMs. The average 
time spent in detention by each illegal alien, meanwhile, fell from 90 days to 21 days.169  
In the third and fourth quarters of 2006, after the implementation of SBI had begun, the 
number of apprehensions of illegal aliens attempting to cross the border- a statistic taken 
as reflective of the number of successful border crossing attempts- declined by 13 percent 
and 38 percent, respectively, from the previous year’s figures.170 Leaders of the 
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Department of Homeland Security attributed these declines to a deterrent effect of the 
catch-and-return practice of handling apprehended illegal aliens.171 
 
Application of U.S. border control policies to illegal immigrants from the PRC 
 According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Border Patrol 
apprehended 1,653 illegal aliens from the PRC attempting to cross into the U.S. between 
official ports of entry in fiscal year 2005.172  This figure represented 57 percent of the 
total number of removable PRC aliens located by U.S. authorities during that period.173  
Before the implementation of the current U.S. border security strategy, PRC illegal 
aliens- because they almost never fell within the category of illegal aliens requiring 
mandatory detention (criminals and terrorists)- were normally issued a notice-to-appear 
and released into the U.S.  Once released, almost none of the Chinese illegals appeared in 
court for removal proceedings.    
Beginning in fiscal year 2006, as noted above, all apprehended OTMs have been 
subject to Expedited Removal and mandatory detention while awaiting removal. In a 
large number of cases with Chinese illegal aliens, however, the Expedited Removal 
process is slowed because the alien files a claim for asylum.  If the alien is found to have 
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a “credible fear” of persecution, he is referred to an immigration judge with the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).  The alien is detained while awaiting the judge’s 
decision on whether the alien’s claim meets the legal standard of “well-founded fear” that 
warrants the granting of asylum.174   The 8,946 claims filed by PRC citizens surpassed 
the number of claims filed by the nationals of any other country.  In fiscal year 2005, 
7,540 Chinese in the removal process filed for asylum.  This figure for 2005, when added 
to the 2,890 Chinese who were classified as “deportable aliens located,” means that 
nearly three-quarters of Chinese apprehended in the U.S. claimed asylum.* Although no 
statistics are available on the number of Chinese apprehended by USBP between ports of 
entry that ultimately file for asylum, the prevalence of Chinese asylum claims and the 
statements of interviewees suggest that most Chinese apprehended in this manner claim 
asylum. 
If the judge grants the claim for asylum, the alien is allowed to remain in the U.S. 
If, however, the claim is rejected, the removal process moves forward.  As described in 
Chapter 1,in order to remove Chinese aliens, the U.S. law must receive travel documents 
from the PRC authorizing the aliens to be sent to China.  Before these documents can be 
issued to the U.S., PRC officials must confirm the identities and hometowns of the illegal 
aliens, using information that the U.S. government has transmitted to the PRC 
government.  Only after these identities have been confirmed can the travel documents be 
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issued.  According to interviewees from both sides, breakdowns in this process of 
obtaining travel documents based on confirmed identities have been a major factor 
behind the inability of the U.S. and the PRC to establish a practice of regular, swift 
repatriations of illegal aliens. Although the two sides disagreed on causal factors, they 
agreed that the investigation process is exceptionally time-consuming and frustrating.   
Officials from the PRC attributed the problems partly to the remote locales 
involved in the process.  After receiving the names, hometowns, and other identifying 
information on the illegal aliens from U.S. investigators by way of the U.S. Embassy in 
Beijing, PRC authorities disseminate the information to the relevant provincial Public 
Security Bureau (PSB).  The PSB then conducts an investigation in order to verify the 
identities and information for the illegal aliens.  For illegal migrants who are urban 
residents, PSB authorities can check the identities against automated hukou records.  The 
confirmation of identities for rural residents, however, is much more complicated, 
claimed PRC officials, because relatives and family members in remote villages or 
sparsely populated mountainous areas must be located and interviewed. 
The factor most responsible for slowing the investigations, in the opinion of one 
PRC official, is incomplete and inaccurate information that PRC law enforcement 
officials receive from the U.S.  When U.S. investigators collect information from the 
Chinese illegal aliens, the Americans have no way of gauging the information’s veracity.  
Not until the information is in the hands of Chinese investigators can its accuracy be 
tested.  Without accurate information, the identity of an illegal Chinese alien in the U.S. 
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cannot be confirmed, so there is no place to which that person may be repatriated, said a 
PRC official.175   
Interviewees from the U.S. side readily acknowledge that while the information 
they submit often contains errors or problems, similar issues with countries of origin of 
other illegal immigrants have been addressed and overcome.  The PRC, in the eyes of 
U.S. officials, has not demonstrated a commitment to improve the speed and efficiency of 
the verification and confirmation process.  Instead, said multiple persons, the PRC 
verification process is extremely slow and inefficient.  Indeed, a 2006 report on detention 
and removal of illegal aliens by the Department of Homeland Security Office of the 
Inspector General cited China- along with Iran, Jamaica, and India- as a country that 
blocks or inhibits the repatriation of illegal aliens through “imposing a slow and 
problematic travel document process.”176  Some U.S. officials see the Chinese as overly 
fixated on the process and driven by rigid adherence to bureaucratic processes. 
The slowness in the issuance of travel documents not only delays the return of 
some PRC illegal aliens; the slowness renders highly unlikely the chances that most of 
the illegals will ever be repatriated.  A Supreme Court ruling forbids the U.S. 
government, except in special circumstances, from detaining an illegal immigrant with a 
final order of removal beyond the 180 days. If the alien cannot be removed after this 
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period, he must be released on parole.177  If the PRC, therefore, does not issue travel 
documents within 180 days after a Chinese illegal alien receives a final order of removal, 
then the U.S. must release that alien from detention- thus negating the U.S. goal of 
detaining all illegal aliens until their removal.  According to a former U.S. official closely 
involved in repatriation matters, the PRC’s slowness in issuing travel orders over the 
years, leading to the releases of Chinese illegal aliens in accordance with court orders, is 
the primary cause behind the problem that Homeland Security Secretary Michael 
Chertoff stated in June 2006 that the population of illegal Chinese aliens in the U.S. was 
“the largest population that we’ve had difficulty in returning.”178  Thus, by creating a 
near-certainty that detained illegal Chinese aliens will be released into the U.S., the 
inability to effect repatriations encourages Chinese to attempt to immigrate illegally to 
the U.S., thereby undermining repatriation-based deterrence while at the same time 
boosting the demand for human smuggling to the U.S. 
 Remote villages, inaccurate information, failure to issue travel documents in a 
timely manner, and a seemingly rigid adherence to bureaucratic processes all have played 
clear roles in obstructing bilateral cooperation on the repatriation issue.  There are, 
however, deeper causes that underlie the inaction on repatriations.  Anecdotal evidence 
from interviews and prior research suggest that these factors may include PRC frustration 
with the U.S. asylum policy, corruption and complicity of local officials, a link between 
repatriations and fugitives, and the ability of local governments in the source 
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communities of human smuggling and illegal immigration to hinder or obstruct 
implementation of central government directives; additional research into the internal 




From the time of its creation in 1997, the JLG’s advancement of Sino-U.S. law 
enforcement cooperation against human smuggling has underscored the important role 
that bilateral institutions play to help the two sides combat security threats posed by 
transnational crime.   Meanwhile, however, the cessation or intensification of law 
enforcement cooperation in response to sudden changes in the macroclimate of Sino-U.S. 
relations indicates that bilateral law enforcement cooperation rests on a rather unstable 
footing; relations that are cooperative today could be ridden with conflict tomorrow.  The 
likelihood of successful future Sino-U.S. law enforcement cooperation against human 
smuggling, therefore, will be enhanced by a commitment from both sides to strengthen 
cooperative law enforcement institutions, and by a joint effort to stabilize the foundation 
that supports such cooperation.  That is, both sides must work to make law enforcement 
cooperation more regularized and less susceptible to higher-level political shifts. 
Human smuggling from China directly involves many nations in addition to the 
U.S. and the PRC.  Smugglers may route migrants through multiple regions of the world, 
including Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, and Central America, as they make 
their way from China to the U.S.  In addition, the U.S. is one of many nations that 
commonly serve as final destination countries for smuggled Chinese migrants. While the 
JLG has indeed enabled closer cooperation between PRC and U.S. authorities to combat 
human smuggling, the anti-smuggling efforts of a bilateral institution can be only 
partially effective against smugglers operating in small, flexible transnational networks. 
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The effectiveness of the JLG working group on human smuggling could be 
improved by the inclusion of other states in a multilateral working group, with 
representation from multiple countries through which smuggling routes pass; this group 
would include both transit countries and destination countries, with leadership of the 
group coming from PRC and U.S. officials.  A multilateral working group would position 
law enforcement authorities from the PRC, the U.S., and other participating countries to 
coordinate policies and develop anti-smuggling strategies that more adequately meet the 
transnational operations and network-centric structures of Chinese human smuggling 
organizations.   
A strong multilateral working group on Chinese human smuggling can also help 
accomplish another need identified in the findings of this study: the task of rendering the 
Sino-U.S. cooperation less subject to political shifts in the overall bilateral relationship.  
Peter Haas writes that regimes can have a transformative effect on state behavior: as a 
group of actors from different countries working together on an issue are empowered, the 
actors can change the practices of their states. In this “epistemic community,” 
participants’ shared knowledge and beliefs about an issue become the common bond 
among in the group; the actors do not merely reflect the domestic interests of their 
respective nations.  The actors’ recognized expertise in a particular policy area is the 
basis for the actors’ authority with policy makers from their respective countries.179  
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How could a multilateral working group on Chinese human smuggling be, as 
Haas describes, a community of experts who help shape the policies and behaviors of 
their respective states’ law enforcement leaders? 
To empower the working group participants and minimize the possibility that 
cooperation between states will be influenced disproportionately by high-level political 
factors (rather than by shared views among experts of the transnational smuggling 
problem), representation on the working group should draw from leading practitioners as 
well as from scholars in the fields of criminal justice and international migration.  Instead 
of seeking to most effectively coordinate existing policies of the various states 
represented, a multilateral working group of experts on Chinese human smuggling could 
develop strategies and approaches to combat smuggling that follow from the group’s 
analysis of human smuggling’s core causes.  In short, a multilateral working group of law 
enforcement practitioners and scholars with expertise in transnational crime and Chinese 
human smuggling can play a major role in assisting not only Sino-U.S. law enforcement 
cooperation to combat smuggling, but cooperation among all other affected nations as 
well. 
Finally, additional research is needed to uncover the deeper sources of the 
repatriation problem.  Preliminary information indicates that there are political and 
economic motives behind the PRC’s hesitancy to accept repatriations of illegal Chinese 
immigrants from the U.S.  On the political side, one researcher reports that the PRC’s 
policy of calling upon other countries to conduct indiscriminate repatriations of illegal 
migrants (rather than returning some migrants while granting asylum to others) is rooted 
in Beijing’s opposition to the politicization of migration issues by other states.   The 
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PRC’s position is that selective repatriations only serve to attract more illegal migrants.  
In the case of illegal Chinese immigrants to the U.S., for example, the U.S. seeks to 
return only those immigrants who asylum claims have been adjudicated and rejected.  
Such a practice, in the view of the PRC, fuels more attempts at illegal immigration.180   
On the economic side, the significance of illegal immigrants’ remittances as a 
contributor to the economic development of native villages and towns in Fujian has been 
well documented.181  The benefits that illegal emigration can bring to local economies 
gives local officials in Fujian the incentive to ensure that the flow of illegal migrants 
from Fujian to the U.S. (or to other parts of the world) continues uninterrupted and 
unhindered.  What is the nature of the relationship between Beijing’s political stance 
against partial repatriations and local economic incentives against repatriations?  Which 
factor, political or economic, is more important as an ultimate influence on the 
acceptance (or non-acceptance) by the PRC of repatriated illegal migrants from the U.S.?  
Future research in this area should seek to understand the political economy of the PRC’s 
decision-making on receiving repatriated illegal immigrants.  The findings of the study 
would form the basis of a U.S. plan to achieve regular repatriations to the PRC of illegal 
Chinese immigrants. 
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1. The U.S. and PRC should take the lead in the creation of a multilateral working 
group on Chinese human smuggling.  The working group would bring together 
law enforcement officials and scholars (in law, criminal justice, sociology, and 
international migration) from nations affected by Chinese human smuggling, 
including transit countries and destination countries.  The governments 
represented in the working group should empower their group’s expert members 
to develop a comprehensive international law enforcement strategy to combat 
Chinese human smuggling, with the assurance that the resulting strategy will 
provide a framework for international cooperation among the various 
governments. 
 
The JLG working group on human smuggling could form the initial core of this 
new multilateral group.  The Department of State’s Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) would be the lead agency 
supporting this group, and meetings of the group could be held at the INL-
supported International Law Enforcement Academy for Southeast Asia in 
Bangkok, or at the ILEA graduate facility in Roswell, New Mexico. 
 
2. PRC authorities and consular officials in the U.S. should conduct interviews of 
apprehended illegal immigrants who are under final orders for removal to the 
PRC.  Direct involvement in the interview process by PRC officials, including the 
collection of names, hometowns, and birthdates, could expedite the process of 
 88 
identity confirmation in the PRC by eliminating the possibility that U.S. officials 
will transmit inaccurate information to PRC authorities.  An expedited identity 
confirmation process could hasten the completion of repatriations.  Likewise, the 
expedited identity confirmation process could help reveal the true reasons for the 
repatriation difficulties. 
 
3. The JLG currently maintains an expert group on “fugitives and repatriations.”  
These issues- fugitives and repatriations- should be de-linked, and the group 
should be split into two groups.  According to several JLG participants, the PRC’s 
main interest in fugitives through the JLG involves securing the return of corrupt 
CCP officials who have absconded to the U.S. with exorbitant sums of money.  
The main interest of the U.S. with respect to repatriations, meanwhile, is the 
acceptance by the PRC of the nearly 40,000 Chinese citizens whom the U.S. seeks 
to deport.  The linking of the fugitives and repatriations issues in one working 
group has created an implicit connection between the two issues, such that 
securing the apprehension and repatriation to the PRC of Chinese fugitives by the 
U.S. may be seen by PRC authorities as a prerequisite for accepting the 
repatriations of illegal immigrants.  The lack of a U.S.-PRC extradition treaty and 
the legal rights of individuals to due process, however, prevent the U.S. from 
simply trading fugitives for compliance with illegal immigrant repatriations.  
Dividing the fugitives and repatriations group into two groups could therefore 




4. Taiwan’s experience with repatriating illegal immigrants should be studied by 
U.S. diplomats and U.S. immigration authorities.  The PRC had long shown 
reluctance to accept the repatriation of its citizens detained by Taiwan as illegal 
immigrants.  By February 2007, however, successful repatriations brought the 
number of Chinese citizens awaiting deportation from Taiwan to zero.  In the 
view of the Vice Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the PRC’s 
acceptance of repatriations signified that Beijing was facing up to the problem of 
illegal emigration and showing concern for its citizens.182  U.S. State Department 
officials, along with officials from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
should meet with their Taiwan counterparts in order to understand the factors that 
influenced the PRC’s policy change on receiving returned illegal immigrants from 
Taiwan.  Taiwan’s experience may prove to offer lessons for U.S. authorities on 
effecting a change in the PRC’s willingness to receive repatriations of illegal 
Chinese immigrants in the U.S. 
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